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Rabbi Jose ben Kisma said, “I was once walking by the way when a man met me 
and greeted me, and I returned his salutation. He said to me, ‘Rabbi, from what 
place are thou?’ I said to him, ‘I come from a great city of Sages and Scribes.’ He 
said to me, ‘If thou art willing to dwell with us in our place, I will give thee a 
thousand thousand golden denars and precious stones and pearls.’ I replied to him, 
‘If thou wert to give me all the silver and gold and precious stones and pearls in the 
world, I would not dwell elsewhere but in a place of Torah.’”  
And thus it is written in the Book of Psalms by the hands of David, King of Israel, 
“The Law of Thy mouth is better unto me than thousands of gold and silver, and 
not only so, but in the hour of a man’s departure, neither silver nor gold nor precious 
jewels nor pearls accompany him, but only Torah study and good works, as it is 
said, ‘When thou walkest it shall lead thee, when thou liest down it shall watch over 
thee, and when thou awakest it shall talk with thee.’” 
—Avot 6:9   
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Abstract 
 
Three Essays on Applied Epistemology 
 
Samuel Fox Krauss, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Sinan Dogramaci 
 
This dissertation contains three essays, each of which discusses a distinct way in 
which the particular status our beliefs have should affect the way we treat others. 
In the first essay, I begin with an account of epistemic damage—a proposal about 
how to measure epistemic harm. Second, I give an account of expected epistemic damage, 
which allows us to draw a principled line from epistemic harm to moral blameworthiness. 
Third, I use the notion of expected epistemic damage to solve a dilemma I pose for the 
dominant account of lying. I critique, and offer a replacement for, a widely-accepted 
necessary condition on lying—that the speaker believes the negation of what they assert.  
In the second essay, I argue that when people behave in a way that we believe is 
morally impermissible but toward which they are morally indifferent, we ought to pay them 
to forgo that behavior. People have legal entitlements to act in some ways that others regard 
as morally impermissible. But people exercise these entitlements, nevertheless. When they 
do, others have a defeasible reason to stop them. The circumstances will dictate whether 
they should, and, if so, the best method: one might convince them that what they are doing 
 vii 
is wrong; one might explain that people will dislike them if they persist; one might ask 
them nicely, or threaten them. Or, one could pay them.  
In the third essay, I address arguments in both the philosophical and legal literature 
according to which statistical evidence cannot alone be sufficient evidence for a judgment 
in a civil trial or a conviction in a criminal trial. I argue that this dominant view is mistaken. 
Broadly, the argument relies on the presumption that any probative evidence ought to be 
given its due. I argue that the very many arguments presented against the sufficiency of 
statistical evidence are not strong enough to overcome this presumption.  
 viii 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation contains three essays, each of which discusses a distinct way in 
which the particular status our beliefs have should affect the way we treat others. 
In the first essay, I begin with an account of epistemic damage—a proposal about 
how to measure epistemic harm. Second, I give an account of expected epistemic damage, 
which allows us to draw a principled line from epistemic harm to moral blameworthiness. 
Third, I use the notion of expected epistemic damage to solve a dilemma I pose for the 
dominant account of lying. I critique, and offer a replacement for, a widely-accepted 
necessary condition on lying—that the speaker believes the negation of what they assert. 
The hope is that this will bring some clarity and precision to a frequent kind of interaction 
and make it easier to assess damage and assign blame. The contribution of the paper is to 
argue that the degree of confidence we have in what we assert, in part, determines the extent 
to which we are blameworthy for certain assertions. 
In the second essay, I argue that when people behave in a way that we believe is 
morally impermissible but toward which they are morally indifferent, we ought to pay them 
to forgo that behavior. People have legal entitlements to act in some ways that others regard 
as morally impermissible. But people exercise these entitlements, nevertheless. When they 
do, others have a defeasible reason to stop them. The circumstances will dictate whether 
they should, and, if so, the best method: one might convince them that what they are doing 
is wrong; one might explain that people will dislike them if they persist; one might ask 
them nicely, or threaten them. Or, one could pay them. When our beliefs match up with 
others in a particular way—where we believe they are behaving impermissibly and they 
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believe they are engaging in permissible but not obligatory behavior, the particular mis-
match of the attitudes create an opportunity for moral improvement.   
In the third essay, I address arguments in both the philosophical and legal literature 
according to which statistical evidence cannot alone be sufficient evidence for a judgment 
in a civil trial or a conviction in a criminal trial. I argue that this dominant view is mistaken. 
Broadly, the argument relies on the presumption that any probative evidence ought to be 
given its due. I argue that the very many arguments presented against the sufficiency of 
statistical evidence are not strong enough to overcome this presumption.  
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2 EPISTEMIC DAMAGE 
If someone punches you in the nose, we have a way to assess the harm to the body. 
And we can determine legal liability and moral blameworthiness. When you are misled, by 
contrast, you suffer epistemic harm, in addition to other harms you might suffer. But, we 
don’t quite have a way to assess epistemic harm or a principled way to relate epistemic 
harm to moral blameworthiness. This paper proposes to do both. First, I give an account of 
epistemic damage, which is a proposal about how to measure epistemic harm. Second, I 
give an account of expected epistemic damage, which allows us to draw a principled line 
from epistemic harm to moral blameworthiness. Third, I use the notion of expected 
epistemic damage to solve a dilemma I pose for the dominant account of lying. The hope 
is that this will bring some clarity and precision to a frequent kind of interaction and make 
it easier to assess damage and assign blame. I’ll note from the outset that much of this 
project is exploratory. 
 Imagine that Albert, but not Bob, knows that the forecast says it will rain. Before 
he leaves the house, Bob asks Albert whether it will rain. Albert lies to Bob and tells him 
that it won’t. Bob thereby comes to believe that it won’t rain, leaves the house for the day 
without an umbrella, and later gets soaking wet and catches pneumonia. Clearly, Albert 
has done something wrong, and is at least partially responsible for Bob’s getting wet, if not 
also for his getting sick. But he also inflicted another kind of harm on Bob—epistemic 
harm: Albert caused Bob to come to have a false belief that Albert knew was false. How 
should we assess this harm and how should we determine the extent to which Albert is 
blameworthy? To answer these questions, we have to ask, first, what is the object of the 
 4 
damage, and, second, in virtue of what is that thing damaged? Third, we’ll have to figure 
out the relationship between epistemic harm and moral blameworthiness. In what follows, 
I’ll use what I take to be a simple, paradigm case of infliction of epistemic damage: lying. 
In this case, the speaker lies to the dupe1, who thereby comes to (falsely) believe the 
proposition that the speaker asserted.   
2.1 Epistemic Damage 
2.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first step is to determine what, or who, suffers epistemic damage. The object 
(victim) of the damage, I want to say, is the person. That is, while parts of a person might 
be said to have been damaged, in the relevant sense the kind of things one can be 
blameworthy for damaging, at least in this context, are people. This is less than obvious. If 
someone is punched in the nose, we might give several different answers to the question 
“What (or who) is the object of the damage?” We might say that the nose was damaged, or 
the nasal septum. But in determining liability, it seems to me the relevant fact is that the 
person was harmed. And while we can determine the extent to which they were harmed by 
looking at their nose, the interesting thing is that they were harmed, not their nose, and not 
their septum, even though we might speak, informally, that way. In the same way, I’ll 
assume from here that the object (or victim) of the epistemic damage is the person who’s 
been harmed, and not their beliefs or mind or anything else. I’m not saying that this is the 
                                                 
1 As best I could determine, the first use of dupe, in the philosophical literature, is due to Bok, Lying: Moral 
Choice in Public and Private Life.  
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correct view of the object of damage in every case, but I’m taking it for granted because it 
makes the most sense for my purposes.  
 The second step, which is really the task of this section, is to determine the form 
the damage takes. Or, to put it another way, to determine in virtue of what someone can be 
truthfully said to have been epistemically damaged. To determine this we have to first 
determine what is epistemically important (or valuable). Here are some contenders: full 
beliefs; accuracy; knowledge; justification; the total number of beliefs; important beliefs; 
epistemic abilities (or rational capacity).  
My sense is that practical considerations will at least partially determine which of 
the above is the most salient, and this will vary by context. Sticking with the nose example, 
we might ask what it is for a person to suffer damage to their nose. Well, one way is to 
make it such that the person can no longer smell. To assess the extent of this kind of 
damage, we can administer smelling tests: the greater the loss of smell, the greater the 
damage. However, in some situations we won’t care about olfactory capabilities, and in 
those cases we would want to talk about the structure of the nose: we’d want to know which 
bones were broken, and how badly. It doesn’t seem as though there is a fact of the matter 
about which kind of nasal damage is the most important, but rather one or the other might 
be more salient. It could be that there’s one best, all-things-considered kind of damage. 
Here I’ll articulate what I think is the most compelling, all-purpose account of epistemic 
damage, although I do not mean to suggest that this is the only, or best account. Then, I’ll 
briefly describe how we might use other contenders in the account of epistemic damage.  
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2.1.2 INCREASE IN INACCURACY AS EPISTEMIC DAMAGE2 
Philosophers who theorize in terms of full beliefs may think about the 
blameworthiness of liars in the following way. A rational agent uses her beliefs, in 
combination with her desires, to act in order to satisfy her desires.3 When a person has true 
beliefs, she acts in ways that tend to satisfy her desires; when a person has false beliefs, 
she acts in ways that tend to frustrate her desires. Thus, we care about having true beliefs. 
(This is consistent with acknowledging that it may not be the case that it’s always better 
for us, practically, to have true beliefs.4) One might instead endorse a non-instrumentalist 
view about the value of true beliefs. I won’t discuss this view further, but it is consistent 
with what I say below.  
 A degree-theoretic account of belief, however, allows for greater precision and a 
finer explanation. We can say, instead, that a person has a credence in a proposition, where 
a credence is a subjective probability one assigns to the truth of a proposition and ranges 
from 0 (the minimal degree of certainty) to 1 (the maximal degree of certainty.) While 
beliefs are either true or false, credences are more or less accurate. Accuracy is measured 
by a scoring rule, which takes as its inputs the agent’s credence and the truth of the 
proposition. We might think of the accuracy of a credence as a measure of “its ‘closeness 
                                                 
2 This section, as well as Sections 2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3, are nearly identical to portions of Krauss, 
Sam Fox, “Lying, risk and accuracy.” Analysis 77(4) (2017): 726–34, of which I am the sole author. 
3 See, e.g., Ramsey, Truth and Probability, 68–74; Stalnaker, Inquiry, 18; Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 
20–33; 43–57.  
4 See, e.g., Kelly, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.” 
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to the truth.’”5 For example, certainty of a true proposition is maximally accurate and 
certainty of a false proposition is maximally inaccurate. Being unsure of a true proposition 
is more inaccurate than if one were sure, but less inaccurate than if one were sure of its 
negation. I’ll note that there is significant controversy about the appropriate desiderata for 
epistemic scoring rules.6 For purposes of this paper, though, we can abstract away from 
most issues that cause controversy. We need only assume what is widely agreed upon: that 
accuracy scores of credences increase as the credence approaches the truth value of the 
proposition. 
Because we need accurate credences to act in ways that tend to satisfy our desires, 
we care about having accurate credences. Call the increase in inaccuracy the victim suffers 
in any discrete interaction epistemic damage.  
Consider an instance of lying from the perspective of an omniscient third party: the 
speaker has some small credence in a false proposition that she nevertheless asserts to the 
dupe. If the dupe trusts the speaker, the dupe will count the speaker’s assertion as evidence 
for the proposition asserted, and the dupe’s credence in that proposition will increase. 
Because the dupe has become more confident in a false proposition, she is epistemically 
worse off—she has suffered epistemic damage. The greater the inaccuracy of our 
credences, the less we will tend to get what we want. So, epistemic damage correlates with 
                                                 
5 Schoenfield, “An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence,” 694. 
6 See the literature on epistemic scoring rules, e.g., Joyce, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”; 
Schoenfield, “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy”; Konek and Levinstein, “The Foundations of 
Epistemic Decision Theory.”  
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real-world, or, practical harm. (This is consistent with acknowledging both that epistemic 
damage does not always cause practical harm and that lying does not always lead to 
epistemic damage.) 
2.1.3 ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION “IN VIRTUE OF WHAT IS THE PERSON 
DAMAGED?” 
In the previous section, I gave an account of epistemic damage using accuracy 
because I think it is the most useful. Although I think an accuracy-first picture makes sense, 
I don’t want epistemic damage to be limited to it. So, although I’ll discuss epistemic 
damage in terms of accuracy, I’ll below elaborate a few other ways in which we could think 
of it. 
 We might want to talk about epistemic damage as concerning full beliefs. Thus, we 
could say something like the following: one is epistemically damaged if they are made to 
have a false belief or to suspend a true belief. Here, if we are talking about full beliefs, 
there are three possibilities: the victim was agnostic with respect to the proposition and was 
convinced of the false proposition’s truth; the victim believed the true proposition and 
became agnostic; or the dupe was agnostic and came to believe its negation. It seems to me 
that the dupe suffered the greatest epistemic damage in the last case. With full beliefs, 
however, it’s not entirely clear how confidence gets into the picture. What if the audience 
believes a proposition, the speaker tells them that it’s false, and while they retain the belief, 
they become less confident in it? On a full-belief picture, it’s not clear what changes, or 
what effect on practical deliberation there will be. In any case, someone who rejects the 
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degree of belief model might be inclined to accept something like this picture, which, 
although I don’t favor it, is not inconsistent with the account I want to give.   
 Epistemic damage might concern knowledge. Imagine that someone knows a 
proposition, but then, through someone else’s action, loses that knowledge. This could be 
in virtue of a loss of any of the constitutive parts of knowledge. Say, for example, someone 
knows that the restaurant closes at 10pm; an ill-intentioned Albert could epistemically 
damage Bob by making him cease to know that about the restaurant. Albert could, for 
example, lie to Bob by telling him that it closes at 9pm, instead. If we imagine that this 
changes the dupe’s belief, so that he no longer believes that it closes at 10pm, then he no 
longer knows it. Or, even if dupe doesn’t change his belief, it could be that the speaker 
defeats his justification, and therefore the audience no longer knows it. He could, for 
example, create a undercutting defeater. Imagine that the speaker asks his friend how they 
know that the restaurant closes at 10pm, and when the dupe says that it says so on the 
website, the speaker could (falsely) say that this restaurant’s website is unreliable or 
outdated. In all these cases, if knowledge is what we’re talking about, then it’s the case that 
the victim has been epistemically harmed in virtue of losing knowledge. If what we care 
about is having justified beliefs, but not knowledge, then the dupe is epistemically damaged 
in the latter case.   
 One account might have it that someone is epistemically damaged if their total 
number of beliefs is diminished. It’s hard to imagine in what kind of case this will be a 
useful measure of damage, and so I’m not inclined to say much more about this.  
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The causing of a loss of beliefs might not count as damage, just as the loss of skin, 
let’s say, might not count as damage, depending on what skin it is, or how it’s removed. It 
could be that only the loss of (or losing justification for, or knowledge of, etc.) important 
beliefs is what matters. It’s hard to give an account of what counts as important beliefs, 
and it’s probably wrong to say that this “important” criterion is an epistemic one, and not 
a practical one. Perhaps one epistemic notion of importance is how central it is in one’s 
web of belief. If one were to give a more sophisticated account of epistemic importance of 
any one belief, one might determine how many other beliefs would be affected by a loss of 
this belief, and take into consideration their importance as well. This could be a way to 
count this as an epistemic and not practical distinction. If, however, one were to say that a 
belief about one’s own medication schedule were more important than one’s beliefs about 
the Napoleonic Wars, this, I think, would not be a measure of epistemic damage, but 
practical damage. Of course, this will affect the blameworthiness of someone who lies 
about these topics, but I want to keep this distinct from the category of epistemic harm. 
 One last way we might conceive of epistemic damage is as harm to a person’s 
rational capacity, which would inhibit their ability to rationally form or retain beliefs or 
obtain knowledge. If you are punched in the nose, and this causes sustained neurological 
harm such that your belief-forming and evidence-evaluating abilities are impaired, we may 
be inclined to count this as a kind of epistemic harm. Or, if the blow causes you to forget 
the last hour of events, this might count as epistemic damage. Perhaps this could be 
measured with an IQ or memory test. It’s hard to know where this departs from practical 
harm, but it doesn’t seem to me out of bounds to think that by impairing someone’s capacity 
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to reason, you’ve harmed them, epistemically. I don’t think that this is the most useful 
notion of epistemic damage, but it’s at least plausible.  
2.1.4 THREE CLARIFICATIONS 
So far, I’ve talked about a person’s being damaged because they are made to have 
a false belief, or their credence in a proposition has become more inaccurate. But this might 
not be the whole picture. In this section, I’ll raise three different choices the proponent of 
an account of epistemic damage will have to make, or at least, consider. Much like 
determining in virtue of what it can be truthfully said that someone was epistemically 
damaged, the choices we make here will likely be context–sensitive, and the right choice 
will depend on the specific purpose to which we put epistemic damage. 
 Up until this point, I’ve talked about the epistemic damage a person suffers with 
respect to the accuracy of their credence in a proposition. In the paradigm case, one suffers 
epistemic damage when they become less confident in a true belief. But, if someone is 
damaged with respect to p, but benefitted with respect to q, then should we say that the 
person has been epistemically damaged? Should we just say that they were damaged with 
respect to p and benefitted with respect to q, or does it just make sense to say that they are 
no worse and no better off? Or, should we say that the damage with respect to p is 
incommensurable with the benefit to q? Or, if they’ve been damaged with respect to p and 
benefitted with respect to q and r, then should we say that they’ve been benefitted, overall. 
Or, does it depend on the relative importance of the beliefs at issue?  
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 Here again, the answer will depend on the context in which the question is asked. 
If someone goes into cardiac arrest, and an EMT breaks that person’s rib in performing 
life-saving CPR, we’d say that that person was overall benefitted. Nevertheless, it’d be odd 
to say that they didn’t suffer any damage; indeed, they’d need to recover from the injury to 
their rib. The context, then, would determine whether it makes sense to talk about local or 
global damage.  
A related question is whether we ought to think about damage at one time or over 
time. That is, how should we discuss the case where someone is damaged with respect to 
a particular belief, but, in the future, that they were damaged in this way caused some 
greater gain? To take another medical example: a child who receives immunizations suffers 
harm to their arm, but is, in the future, less likely to get diseases. Should we say, of this 
child, that they’ve been damaged? In some sense, it would be odd to answer “no” and at 
the same time administer a bandage. The better answer is to say “yes” but that overall, the 
child is better off, and perhaps second, that the small amount of damage was therefore 
justified.  We can imagine that, in some circumstances, suffering damage with respect to 
one belief could cause a future benefit. Consider lies parents routinely tell their children: 
“You can do anything you set your mind to” and the like. The child is damaged with respect 
to that proposition, but let’s just stipulate that believing it enables the student to study 
harder, and thereby, in the future, come to benefit epistemically. Or, we might include a 
small lie that teachers tell their students about a difficult concept or an author’s view. 
Having a false belief about that concept might thereby make it easier to, in the future, gain 
a true belief (or many). 
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 Last, consider when a speaker damages some, but benefits others, epistemically. 
Should we say, of that person, that they’ve done epistemic damage? Here, again, it seems 
that context will determine what the salient notion of damage is.  
2.1.5 HOW ONE INFLICTS EPISTEMIC DAMAGE 
 I’ll just say briefly the ways in which we might think that someone can inflict 
epistemic damage. Here’s a non-exhaustive list: testimony; leaving misleading clues; 
omission, maybe; sending someone to a library where the non-fiction section is full of 
books that give false information; giving someone a concussion. The paradigm case of 
inflicting epistemic damage is an instance of lying where the liar says something that is 
false and where the dupe trusts the liar.   
2.2 Expected epistemic damage 
The first task of this paper was to come up with some method of assessing epistemic 
harm, which I’ve done by advancing an accuracy-based account of epistemic damage. The 
task of this section is to draw a line from epistemic harm to moral blameworthiness. I argue 
that when someone misleads, or lies, or leaves out misleading evidence, that person 
imposes an epistemic risk to their interlocutor (or, if they don’t have someone in mind, any 
person who might come along). The epistemic risk is also a practical risk. The extent to 
which the speaker thinks they’ve put their interlocutor at epistemic risk, the expected 
epistemic damage, will determine, among other factors, their moral blameworthiness. Of 
course, expected epistemic damage does not fully determine moral blameworthiness. Lying 
about heart medication, for example, is a more blameworthy action than lying about the 
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weather, even if the expected epistemic damage is greater in the second instance. And, I 
don’t claim that it’s always morally wrong to inflict epistemic damage. My claims about 
the link between expected epistemic damage and moral blameworthiness are meant to be 
ceteris paribus claims.  
2.2.1 EXPECTED EPISTEMIC DAMAGE AND MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS 
Above, I considered an instance of lying from the third-party perspective. But now 
consider an instance of lying from the liar’s perspective: the liar has some low credence in 
a proposition that she nevertheless asserts to the dupe. The liar thinks the dupe will trust 
her, and therefore thinks that the dupe’s credence in the proposition will increase. From the 
liar’s perspective, her own credence maximizes expected accuracy. Therefore, according 
to the liar, anyone whose credence moves farther away from her own has become more 
inaccurate. While there is controversy about this, the general consensus in the literature is 
that you ought to be immodest about the accuracy of your own credences. This means that 
you should think that the expected accuracy of your own credences is greater than the 
expected accuracy of any other credences you might adopt.7 The intuitive thought is that it 
is irrational to (i) think that there are different credences with a higher expected accuracy 
and (ii) not adopt them as your own.  
 Note that while epistemic damage depends on the truth-value of the proposition the 
liar asserts, expected epistemic damage does not. For example, if the liar mistakenly asserts 
                                                 
7 See the literature on epistemic immodesty, e.g., Joyce, “Accuracy and Coherence,” sec. 8; Horowitz, 
“Immoderately Rational.”  
 15 
a true proposition believing it false, and the dupe increases her credence in the assertion, 
the dupe does not suffer epistemic damage because she is epistemically better off. 
Nevertheless, the liar expected the dupe to suffer, so there is expected epistemic damage. 
Note also that the expected epistemic damage is not the same as the liar’s prediction about 
the dupe’s change in credence. Because the liar’s statement does not vary according to her 
confidence—“It won’t rain” sounds the same, we’ll stipulate, no matter how confident the 
speaker is—we should expect the dupe’s change in credence to be independent of the liar’s 
credence. However, when the liar is more confident that what she asserts is false, she’ll 
expect the dupe to become more epistemically worse off than in the case in which she is 
not as confident that what she asserts is false. Expected epistemic damage is a measure of 
the liar’s estimate of how badly off the speaker will be, which is relative to whatever the 
liar thinks is the (maximally) rational credence to hold: her own. Expected epistemic 
damage is, of course, to be calculated using the speaker’s degree of belief.  
 I claim that the greater the expected epistemic damage, the greater the liar’s 
blameworthiness. The more confident the liar is that what she asserts is false, the more 
inaccurate she will think the dupe will become. The more inaccurate the liar thinks the dupe 
will become, the more likely the liar will think the dupe will not get what she wants. Once 
we adopt a degree-theoretic model of belief, it becomes clear that expected epistemic 
damage will vary according to the confidence the liar has that what she asserts is false. If 
we accept that epistemic damage correlates with practical harm, then it becomes clear that 
expected epistemic damage is a prediction of how badly off the liar thinks that her lie will 
make the dupe. In this way, a liar’s blameworthiness is explained by the risk she imposes 
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on the dupe. Furthermore, this blameworthiness admits of degrees: the greater the liar’s 
confidence that she asserts something false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing 
on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness.  
2.2.2 RISK 
 We can ask, separately, whether a risk is a harm and whether we are blameworthy 
for imposing risks on others. While most argue that imposing a risk doesn’t in itself 
constitute a harm, some have argued that it can.8 In the civil law, this question has garnered 
serious attention because only if there is a harm can there be a tort.9 Put this question aside, 
though. What is uncontroversial is that we can be blameworthy for imposing risks on 
others, even if imposing a risk does not itself constitute a harm, and even if 
blameworthiness does not guarantee civil liability.  
2.2.3 EXPECTED EPISTEMIC DAMAGE WITHOUT ACCURACY 
Above, I gave an account of expected damage in terms of expected accuracy. But, 
I realize that not everyone will be on board with this. So, I want to sketch just how the 
notion of expected damage could work on a model without accuracy.  
 Say that what we care about isn’t accuracy, but truth. That is, of some subset of the 
propositions (the important ones, let’s say), we want to believe the true ones and disbelieve 
                                                 
8 See, for arguments that mere exposure to risk can constitute a harm, Finkelstein, “Is Risk a Harm?”; Placani, 
“When the Risk of Harm Harms.”  
9 That is, the courts and most scholars have rejected “risk-based liability” in favor of “damage-based 
liability.” See, e.g., Porat and Stein, Tort Liability under Uncertainty; Robinson, “Risk, Causation, 
and Harm,” 325 fn15.  
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the false ones. And we only either believe, disbelieve or refrain from belief. On this 
account, one suffers epistemic damage just in case one comes to believe a falsehood, or 
ceases to believe a true proposition. Expected damage, on this model, would be the liar’s 
subjective likelihood that the damage would obtain. And, the greater the liar’s subjective 
likelihood that the damage would obtain, the more likely she’ll think that the dupe won’t 
get what she wants. Thus, here again, the greater the expected epistemic damage the greater 
the moral blameworthiness, ceteris paribus.   
2.2.4 ON WHAT THE EXPECTED DAMAGE DEPENDS 
The speaker’s assessment of her dupe’s expected accuracy will depend on at least 
four things: 1) the speaker’s credence; 2) the speaker’s estimate of what the dupe’s starting 
credence is; 3) the speaker’s estimate of the extent to which the dupe trusts her; 4) the 
speaker’s scoring rule. I’ll address each, in reverse order.  
 Epistemic accuracy is determined by the agent’s credence in a proposition, the truth 
value of that proposition, and the agent’s scoring rule. While some scoring rules are more 
popular than others, one might have an idiosyncratic scoring rule, or, an agent could use 
different scoring rules. What kind of scoring rules the agent uses will determine the 
accuracy, and, therefore, expected accuracy, of any credence. 
 For a given communicative interaction, the more the audience trusts the speaker, 
the more she will increase her credence as a result of the speaker making an assertion. Note, 
this is not equivalent to the following: the more the audience trusts a speaker, the more she 
will increase her credence. Of course, we can trust people immensely but not increase our 
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credence (much) in light of what they say. For example: if your dearest friend tells you that 
a meter is longer than a yard, you wouldn’t increase your already extremely high credence 
in that proposition. And, you likely would increase your credence in what time it is if you 
asked a stranger on the street. Yet this does not entail that you trust the stranger more than 
your friend. I mean here to say only, of a particular case, the more the audience trusts the 
speaker, the more they will increase their credence. In order for the speaker to have a view 
about the extent to which the dupe will be epistemically damaged, the speaker will have to 
think something about the extent to which the dupe will trust her.  
One might here object, then, that this requires that in order for speaker to calculate 
expected epistemic damage they must know a lot about their audience. But, this is not the 
case. In some cases, one might have such knowledge. But, in many other cases, use of 
general information would be sufficient for an approximation. Imagine that the speaker is 
a doctor and the audience her patient. Without knowing much about the patient, the doctor 
may use general background knowledge about how trusting patients are of doctors, or 
female doctors, or doctors when they give bad prognoses. In addition, the audience can use 
background information about how trustworthy audiences are about particular kinds of 
assertions. It’s plausible to think that people are more trusting of speakers who assert the 
kinds of propositions that are more likely to be true. For example, a speaker making an 
outlandish lie would be wrong to expect her audience, barring any particular knowledge 
about the audience, to trust her much.  
 Even if the speaker has a scoring rule and knows exactly the extent to which her 
audience would trust her, she won’t be able to estimate the expected epistemic damage 
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without some inkling of her audience’s starting credence. Expected epistemic damage is a 
measure, by the speaker’s lights, of the distance between what the dupe’s accuracy will be, 
once she updates on the speaker having made an assertion, and what it was before. But, in 
order to estimate where the audience will end up, the speaker has to have some idea of 
where she started. Again, in the absence of particularized knowledge about the audience, 
the speaker can use general, background knowledge. For example, speakers should 
estimate most people’s credence in snow is white as very high, even without any 
particularized information about her audience. If they were they to lie to someone about 
the color of snow, only if they had reason to think that that person would really trust them 
should the expected epistemic be great.  
 Last, expected epistemic damage depends on the speaker’s own credence in the 
proposition. Of course, what the speaker’s credence is won’t affect what the audience’s 
credence is. Because the speaker’s statement does not vary according to her confidence—
“Snow is black” sounds the same no matter how confident the speaker is—we should 
expect the dupe’s change in credence to be independent of the liar’s credence. However, 
when the liar is more confident that what she asserts is false, she’ll expect the dupe to 
become more epistemically worse off than in the case in which she is not as confident that 
what she asserts is false. Expected epistemic damage is a measure of the liar’s estimate of 
how badly off the speaker will be, which is relative to whatever the liar thinks is the 
(maximally) rational credence to hold: her own. Thus, expected epistemic damage is 
proportional to the speaker’s confidence that what she asserts is false. If we ground the 
blameworthiness of lying in expected epistemic damage, then we can say that the greater 
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the speaker’s confidence that she asserts something false, the greater the risk she’ll think 
she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness.  
2.3 Lying, risk and accuracy 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A large literature has yielded near unanimity on two necessary conditions on 
lying.10 One lies about p only if one: 
(1) Says that p 
(2) Believes that not-p. 
Philosophers have discussed what satisfies the first necessary condition and what, if any, 
further necessary conditions there are. But, absent from the literature is any serious 
discussion of the second necessary condition—what I’ll call the belief requirement. In 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Montaigne, The Essays, 20; Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” 66; Demos, “Lying to Oneself,” 
588; Waismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, 294; Siegler, “Lying,” 131; Mannison, 
“Lying and Lies,” 133; Chisholm and Feehan, “The Intent to Deceive,” 152; Davidson, “What 
Metaphors Mean,” 42–43; Fried, Right and Wrong, 55; Coleman and Kay, “Prototype Semantics,” 
28; Kupfer, “The Moral Presumption against Lying,” 104; Primoratz, “Lying and the ‘Method of 
Ethics,’” 52 fn 152; Shibles, Lying: A Critical Analysis, 31; Wiles, “Lying: Its Inconstant Value,” 
275; Adler, “Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating,” 437; Green, “Lying, Misleading, and 
Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements,” 
159; Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, 96; Meibauer, “Lying and Falsely 
Implicating,” 1376; Faulkner, “What Is Wrong with Lying?,” 536; Fallis, “What Is Lying?,” 33; 
Fallis, “What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning,” 348; Fallis, 
348; Sakama, Caminada, and Herzig, “A Logical Account of Lying,” 300; van Ditmarsch et al., “On 
the Logic of Lying,” 42; Fallis, “Lying as a Violation of Grice’s First Maxim of Quality,” 564; Saul, 
“Just Go Ahead and Lie”; Sorensen, “Lying with Conditionals,” 820; Arico and Fallis, “Lies, 
Damned Lies, and Statistics,” 791; Lackey, “Lies and Deception,” 246; Stokke, “Lying and 
Asserting,” 33; Webber, “Liar!,” 652; Rees, “Better Lie!,” 59; Dworkin, “Are These 10 Lies 
Justified?”; Fallis, “Are Bald-Faced Lies Deceptive after All?,” 82; Keiser, “Bald-Faced Lies,” 464; 
Leland, “Rational Responsibility and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies,” 550; Mahon 
and Zalta, “The Definition of Lying and Deception”; Michaelson, “The Lying Test,” 481; Stokke, 
“Lying and Misleading in Discourse,” 106. Slight deviations from this account are Isenberg, 
“Deontology and the Ethics of Lying”; Carson, “The Definition of Lying*”; Fallis, “Davidson Was 
Almost Right about Lying.”  
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addition, although epistemologists have long recognized that people have attitudes of 
degrees of belief instead of (or in addition to) full belief, philosophers have not considered 
the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns not the speaker’s belief, but 
rather her degree-of-belief.11  
 I begin with a claim about what makes liars blameworthy, when they are. I claim 
that the correct explanation of why liars are blameworthy includes the liar’s imposing a 
risk on the audience. This blameworthiness admits of degrees: the greater the liar’s 
confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on 
the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this explanation of what 
makes liars blameworthy, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief requirement is wrong, or 
lying isn’t a particularly interesting concept. I then suggest a principled replacement to the 
belief requirement: the worse-off requirement.   
                                                 
11 I’m not the first, however, to consider the role of degrees of belief in the context of lying. In response to 
a claim by Sorensen (2010) that knowledge-lies do not involve deception, Staffel (2011) and Fallis 
(ms) argue that a dupe is deceived by a liar when the dupe’s confidence in a falsehood increases, 
even if the dupe does not thereby come to believe the falsehood. (Fallis, “Bayesians Don’t Tell 
Knowledge-Lies (and Probably Nobody Else Does Either)”; Staffel, “Reply to Roy Sorensen, 
‘Knowledge-Lies.’”)  Chisholm and Feehan mention that the extent of deception depends on the 
degree of belief the dupe comes to have in the falsehood the liar asserts. (Chisholm and Feehan, 
“The Intent to Deceive.”) While these authors offer important precedents for including degree-
theoretic reasoning in accounts of lying by thinking about the extent to which the dupe is deceived, 
my project is to discuss the speaker using degrees of belief, and, importantly, to give an account of 
blameworthiness for lying that depends on the relationship between the speaker’s degree of belief 
and her expectation about what the dupe’s degree of belief will be. Thanks to an anonymous referee 
for urging me to clarify this point.  
Marsili is, as far as I can tell, the sole person to argue for an account of lying that explicitly takes into 
consideration the role the speaker’s degree of belief ought to play. (Marsili, “Lying as a Scalar 
Phenomenon: Insincerity Along the Certainty-Uncertainty Continuum.”) He replaces the belief 
requirement with a requirement that the speaker must be more confident that the proposition she 
asserts is false, than true. I show why this suggestion is not correct. 
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2.3.2 DILEMMA 
By lying, the speaker does something that she believes will cause the dupe to 
become less epistemically accurate, and, therefore, less likely to be able to satisfy her 
desires. I’ve argued that once we think in terms of degrees of belief, we can appropriately 
explain the blameworthiness of lying as the causing of expected epistemic damage, which 
depends, among other things, on the confidence the speaker has that what she asserts is 
false. But, once we so-ground the blameworthiness of lying in expected epistemic damage, 
the orthodox account of lying faces a dilemma: either the belief requirement is wrong, or 
lying isn’t a particularly interesting concept. In what follows, I explain why the dilemma 
exists and suggest why impaling ourselves on the first horn isn’t all that bad. 
I’ve argued that blameworthiness for lying is best explained by the liar’s imposition 
of risk on the dupe, which I analyze in terms of expected epistemic damage. If the belief 
requirement is correct, then there are nearby cases of non-lies in which the speaker is 
blameworthy for the same reason as the liar, albeit to a lesser degree, without lying. 
However, it’s difficult to see why the belief requirement marks the distinction between lies 
and assertions that, by failing to meet the belief requirement, fall just short of lying. I’ll 
propose, in the next section, that we can make the distinction more intuitive if we abandon 
the belief requirement and instead introduce a requirement involving degrees of belief.12  
                                                 
12 Others have offered accounts of lying that generate other ideas for drawing a principled distinction 
between lies and blameworthy assertions that fall short of lying. Benton (2018), for example, argues 
that we ought to replace the belief requirement with a knowledge requirement. On his view, even if 
the knowledge requirement is not met, and thus one doesn’t lie, one can be blameworthy if one 
“negligently” asserts a proposition, where one negligently asserts a proposition just in case “one 
doesn’t consider whether one knows p.” Benton, “Lying, Belief, and Knowledge,” 128. 
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To get a sense of why the belief requirement is not natural or intuitive, imagine a 
case in which someone is not so confident that we would ascribe belief to her—say, she 
has .6 credence that it will rain. If the speaker nevertheless says that it won’t rain, the 
speaker will think that her audience will be worse off, for trusting her.  This is the case 
even if the speaker’s confidence is not sufficient for belief, and therefore, according to the 
orthodox account, not sufficient for lying. But, we can explain what’s wrong about this 
assertion in the same way as what’s generally wrong about lying. The speaker’s assertion 
that it won’t rain when she has .6 credence that it will, and an assertion that it won’t rain 
when she believes that it will differ only by the magnitude of risk imposition, and, therefore, 
the speaker’s blameworthiness.  If this is the case, it’s hard to see why lying picks out any 
special phenomenon.  
 Imagine if we were to define a “theft” as an intentional taking of someone else’s 
property, worth at least $100. One might balk at the $100 requirement and ask for a 
principled reason why a $40 taking shouldn’t count as a theft, too. Perhaps there is a 
pragmatic explanation: perhaps a statute requires police to investigate all “thefts” but that 
it’s inefficient to investigate takings of less than $100. So, defining “theft” in this way 
makes pragmatic sense. One might think that there is some similar, philosophically 
pragmatic reason for the belief requirement, but it’s far from clear that there is a 
philosophical equivalent to the pragmatic classification of legal concepts, and, even if there 
were, what that justification would be in this case. If the belief requirement is correct, then 
lying does not pick out an especially interesting concept. 
 24 
To address the first horn of the dilemma, if lying really does pick out an interesting 
concept, then the belief requirement must be wrong. One proposal is to replace the belief 
requirement with what Marsili (2014) calls the “comparative insincerity condition,” 
according to which the speaker must be more confident that the proposition she asserts is 
false than true. However, this doesn’t account for the damage lying does. Imagine a case 
in which the speaker is just slightly more confident that p is true than false—say she has 
.51 credence in p. And, further, imagine that the speaker knows that her audience is 
agnostic—that the audience has .5 credence in the proposition. From the speaker’s 
perspective, the audience’s credence is very close to her own, and, therefore, the speaker 
thinks the audience’s credence nearly maximizes expected epistemic accuracy. When the 
speaker asserts that p, supposing the speaker believes the audience will trust her, she’ll 
think that the audience will assume that she is far more confident than she is. Imagine that 
the audience moves from .5 credence to .8 credence. If the speaker’s credence is .51, then 
the speaker will expect the audience to suffer epistemic damage. If the blameworthiness 
for lying is grounded in expected epistemic damage, then this speaker is blameworthy in 
exactly the same way as liars are, even if, according to both the orthodox position and 
Marsili’s proposal, she hasn’t lied.  
2.3.3 THE WORSE-OFF REQUIREMENT 
With the belief requirement, lies are not interestingly distinct from nearby cases. 
My proposal would save lying from being uninteresting. Using the simple, general 
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explanation I’ve given for why liars are blameworthy, it’s possible to construct a principled 
replacement to the belief requirement:  
The worse-off requirement 
 
The expected epistemic damage to the audience, with respect to p, by the speaker’s 
lights, conditional on the audience trusting her with respect to p,  at all, is greater 
than 0.  
 
That is, it’s a necessary condition on lying that the speaker think that, if the dupe trusts her, 
the dupe will be worse off, epistemically. I’ve deliberately made the requirement 
conditional on the audience trusting the speaker; it puts off a decision about whether intent 
to deceive is a necessary condition on lying. For those who argue that bald-faced lies 
(assertions by a speaker who believes both that the proposition she asserts is false and that 
her audience won’t trust her) are lies, then the two above conditions might be sufficient for 
lying.13 Those who argue that intent to deceive is a necessary condition on lying would add 
a further condition: that the speaker expect the dupe to trust her. My worse-off requirement 
takes no position in this debate. 
 My view allows that some assertions that are not lies can be blameworthy (of 
course), and I also allow that the blameworthiness of some of those assertions can be given 
a closely related, structurally similar explanation using the notion of expected epistemic 
damage. Where I draw a principled, natural boundary around lying, however, is when 
damage is done with respect to p, the proposition asserted. I claim this is more intuitive 
than where advocates of the belief requirement must draw the boundary.  
                                                 
13 See the literature on bald-faced lies, e.g., Sorensen, “Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to 
Deceive”; Lackey, “Lies and Deception”; Fallis, “Are Bald-Faced Lies Deceptive after All?”  
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I’ll note here two further features of the worse-off requirement. First, it is 
compatible with epistemic models that eschew belief entirely in favor of degrees of belief.14 
If the belief requirement is correct, it’s not clear what lying is for a Bayesian without belief, 
for example. My replacement to the belief requirement provides an answer. Second, the 
worse-off requirement is consistent with including knowledge-lies as lies. According to 
Roy Sorensen, an “assertion that p is a knowledge-lie exactly if intended to prevent the 
addressee from knowing that p is untrue but is not intended to deceive the addressee into 
believing that p.”15 Sorensen claims that knowledge-lies do not involve deception, but 
Staffel 2011 and Fallis (ms) convincingly show that the interesting cases do, because even 
though the dupe does not come to believe the false assertion, she becomes more confident 
in it. The worse-off requirement is consistent with an account of lying according to which 
most, though perhaps not all, knowledge-lies count as lies.  
 I’ve argued that once we think in terms of degrees of belief and accept a simple 
explanation for the blameworthiness of lying, we arrive at a dilemma. To tackle that 
dilemma, I’ve suggested a principled alternative to the belief requirement—the worse-off 
requirement. Although nearly every philosopher who has given an account of lying has 
endorsed the belief requirement, my revision is not all that radical. The worse-off 
requirement recasts lying as involving an imposition of risk on the audience and better 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Jeffrey 1970, who writes that “our ordinary notion of belief is only vestigially present in the 
notion of degree of belief” Jeffrey, “Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief,” 171–
72.; or see Christensen 2004, who demotes the importance of binary belief for epistemic rationality. 
Christensen, Putting Logic in Its Place, 96–105. 
15 Sorensen, “Knowledge-Lies,” 610. 
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captures what usually makes lying blameworthy: that the speaker expects the dupe to be 
worse off, for trusting her. 
2.4 Objections 
I’ve argued that if lying is an interesting concept, then the belief requirement is 
wrong. I’ve replaced the belief requirement with the worse-off requirement, and also 
argued that the more confident the speaker is that what they assert is false, the more 
blameworthy they are for lying. In doing so, I’ve favored degrees-of-belief over outright 
belief. One might take this to entail, or suggest, that lying, then, is a graded phenomenon. 
I won’t argue that this is not the case, but I want to resist the inference to it from anything 
I’ve said, above. Just because belief is graded, and belief (in some way) is a constitutive 
element of lying, this does not mean that lying itself is graded. For example, say that theft 
is the intentional taking of another’s property. Thus, taking some amount property is a 
constitutive element of theft. Amounts of property come in degrees: $1, $5, etc. It doesn’t 
follow that a theft of $100 is more of a theft than that of $1. Granted, it is a theft of more 
money, and the thief might be more blameworthy and subject to increased penalties, but it 
doesn’t entail that one is more of a theft than the other.  
Another objection might be that, on my view, with one statement one can lie to one 
subset of an audience but not the other. Imagine a case in which a speaker has two audience 
members: one gullible, the other incredulous, and the speaker knows this. The speaker says 
something she believes is false. On my view, there will be expected epistemic damage for 
one but not the other. And, if the blameworthiness for lying depends on the expected 
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epistemic damage, then it seems to follow that the speaker is both blameworthy and not 
blameworthy for lying. Both of these consequences might seem odd, and thus might pose 
a problem for my view. 
If this objection poses a problem for my view, though, it is a problem for lying 
generally, at least for those accounts of lying according to which the speaker must intend 
to deceive her audience. Take any case in which a speaker knows that her audience 
members have differing levels of credulity. If lying requires intent to deceive, then the 
speaker, in making one assertion, will have lied and not lied. And this might seem like a 
bad result. But this does not seem troubling to me. If lying requires an audience, then it 
seems that, in saying one thing, a speaker can lie to some and not to others. And this is the 
same on my view: in saying one thing, one can lie to some but not to others. One can be 
blameworthy for lying because of the harm to one person, even if another is unharmed.   
As a brief aside, this is not unique to lying. Consider someone who, in a body of 
water, flips over a raft on which two people are sitting: one who can swim, and one who 
can’t. With one action, the person can both harm one person and not harm another. She can 
be blameworthy for what she does to one person, and not to another. Of course, she might 
be all-things-considered blameworthy for flipping the raft, but this is true in the lying case 
as well.  
If, as I say, epistemic damage correlates with practical harm, and we can say that 
expected epistemic damage is a prediction of how badly off the liar thinks that her lie will 
make the dupe, then one might object that we should just skip the expected epistemic 
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damage altogether and think only about the practical consequences.16 That is, if expected 
epistemic damage is useful only as a proxy for practical damage, what’s the point of it?  
Basically, I want the notion of epistemic damage to be used in many different kinds 
of circumstances. One communicative interaction, causing some fixed amount of epistemic 
damage, may lead to several different inferences about blame. Or, whether the epistemic 
damage inflicted in a particular case causes actual harm will depend on the circumstances. 
Other times, we might not know the practical consequences of a communicative 
interaction, and measuring the epistemic damage is a good stand-in. Take, for example, 
blood loss. Presumably, we care about blood loss only insofar as it affects our health. Why, 
then, should EMT’s say anything about blood loss of a patient, and not instead just say 
what the harms are, or what the remedy ought to be? For one thing, whether the blood loss 
is salient will depend on the circumstances. The prescribed treatment might not depend 
only on the amount of blood loss, but also the desires of the patient, or the status of the 
patient’s kidneys, or other factors. Maybe sometimes blood loss is good: when someone 
donates, for example. But the amount of blood a patient has lost is an important piece of 
data that medical staff use in treating patients.  
One might object that my replacement to the belief requirement is consistent with 
the classification of some assertions as lies that the traditional account would exclude. And, 
one might object that some assertions that might have been classified as lies on the 
traditional account, no longer would. My inclination is to bite the bullet on these kinds of 
                                                 
16 Thanks to Kenny Easwaran for raising this concern.  
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cases. In general, there are cases in which one asserts a proposition one believes is false in 
which the worse-off requirement is not met, and there are cases in which one asserts a 
proposition one believes is true and the worse-off requirement is met. If these cases seem 
to lead to unintuitive results, my strongest response is that’s because the orthodox account 
of lying is either uninteresting or else has the wrong necessary condition. A weaker 
response is that I’m merely providing a necessary condition, and that in those cases where 
the worse-off condition is met, and yet it does not seem like a lie, anyone inclined could 
articulate further necessary conditions to rule out the case as an instance of lying. For now, 
let me address, at some length, one kind of case one might make.  
The speaker, A, has .6 credence in p, and knows that the audience, B, has .9 
credence in p. A has good reason to believe that, because of the nature of B’s 
evidence, B won’t decrease her credence much below .6, even if A says that p is 
false. In a charitable effort to bring B’s credence closer to A’s own, and knowing 
that it won’t fall much below .6, A says that p is false.  
  
Assuming that .6 credence in p is sufficient for belief, most, I think, still wouldn’t 
count this as a lie. That the liar must intend to deceive the audience is a view shared by 
most who’ve written on lying, though not all.17 In the case as described, A’s intent is to 
make B’s credence more accurate. And, A has good reason to think that, given the unusual 
and somewhat artificial nature of the thought experiment, by asserting that p, this will be 
the case. Thus, A does not intend to deceive B. So, assuming the plausible intent-to-deceive 
requirement, this is not an instance of lying. At worst, this case shows that the worse-off 
requirement works only on views according to which intent to deceive is a necessary 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Carson, “The Definition of Lying*”; Sorensen, “Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to 
Deceive”; Fallis, “What Is Lying?” 
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condition on lying. However, I’ve intentionally made the worse-off requirement consistent 
with accounts of lying that do not require intent to deceive, so it’d be better for my purposes 
to not make this concession. So, let me add a further argument.  
The case as described ought to be counted as a lie only if we adhere to the belief 
requirement and don’t require intent to deceive. The wide array of accounts of lying that 
include the belief requirement, I think, fail to properly appreciate the normative properties 
of lying. I’ve argued that a good account of lying ought to capture why liars are 
blameworthy. The belief requirement leaves out a great number of these kinds of cases. 
The worse-off requirement explains, better than the belief requirement does, what makes 
liars blameworthy—namely, that the liar expects her audience to be epistemically worse 
off. If this unusual case seems intuitively to count as a lie, then I think it’s a justifiable cost 
to my proposal that it excludes this case in exchange for the great gain of many cases that 
share the interesting features of lies, but, on the traditional view, are excluded. 
  Matthew Benton (2018) proposes three counterexamples to my revised account of 
lying.18 However, the purported counterexamples fail. Essentially, what Benton shows is 
that, with my revision, some cases that would have counted as lies by the traditional 
account, don’t, and others that would not have, do. Of course, I count this as a virtue of my 
revision. Benton’s strategy is successful only if we are already committed to the traditional 
account, which is the very thing I seek to challenge.  
  I’ll now discuss each of the purported counterexamples.  
                                                 
18 Benton, “Lying, Accuracy and Credence.” 
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Case 1: A’s credence in p is 1, B’s in p is 0 (and 1 in ~p), and A knows this. 
A asserts to B that ~p.19 
   
  Benton correctly notes that this case fails WORSE-OFF: Because B is already 
maximally confident that ~p, B cannot be epistemically worse-off, by A’s lights. Therefore 
on my account it is not a lie. It is purportedly a counterexample because “A is maximally 
certain that what A asserts is false, so A’s assertion is intuitively a lie.”20 But this 
explanation of the case as a counterexample fails for two reasons.  
  First, the only justification Benton gives for Case 1 to serve as a counterexample is 
that it meets the belief requirement (or, one might say, because of A’s certainty, exceeds 
it). The whole point of my argument is to challenge the belief requirement. Putting forward 
a case whose only merit is that it meets the belief requirement, as a counterexample against 
an account that rejects the belief requirement, is question-begging. 
  Second, even if the case meets the belief requirement, it fails a requirement that 
most, but not all, believe to be a necessary condition on lying: that the speaker intends to 
deceive her audience. In the case as presented, A can’t both know that B’s credence in p is 
0 and intend to deceive her about p: Necessarily, when one has 0 credence in a position, no 
new information can change that. Because A knows that nothing she says about p will 
change B’s mind, she can’t intend to deceive B.21 Thus, the case is not a lie according to 
                                                 
19 Benton, 196. 
20 Benton, 196. 
21 One possible rejoinder is that A might succeed in deceiving B about whether she, A, believes that p. That 
is, even if A won’t change B’s confidence with respect to whether it will rain tomorrow, she will be 
able to trick B into thinking that A believes it will rain. I take it, however, that of those who think 
that the intention to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, the thing about which one must intend 
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most people. For this reason Case 1 is an odd choice if it is meant to be an obvious example 
of lying. It’s also an odd case because there are few propositions in which (rational) people 
have zero credence, and even fewer where their interlocutor knows this.  
Case 2: A’s credence in p is 1, B’s in p is 0.1 (and 0.9 in ~p), and A knows this. A 
asserts to B that ~p.22 
 
Benton correctly notes that Case 2 passes WORSE-OFF, and therefore on my 
account could be a lie. I say “could be” because WORSE-OFF is only a necessary 
condition. Assume it is a lie, though.  
That one could count Case 2 but not Case 1 as a lie is problematic to Benton. In 
both cases, Benton writes, “…A has the same high confidence that the asserted p is false, 
and intuitively both cases are lies if either of them is.”23 Put another way, because in both 
cases A believes that p is false, whether A lies shouldn’t vary between the cases. 
However, Benton is wrong to think that simply because in the two cases the speaker 
has the same high confidence in the falsity of the proposition she asserts the speaker is 
either lying in both cases or not lying in both cases. You don’t have to buy my revisionary 
account to see that Benton is incorrect here. Anyone who believes that intent to deceive is 
a necessary condition on lying should immediately realize that two cases, keeping the 
speaker’s confidence constant, can differ in whether they are lies. Take the following pair 
of cases:  
                                                 
to deceive their audience is the truth of proposition asserted, not (only) the speaker’s attitude toward 
the proposition asserted.  
22 Benton, “Lying, Accuracy and Credence,” 196. 
23 Benton, 197. 
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Case 4: A speaker wearing a white sweater stands in front of an audience and says 
“I am wearing a blue sweater.” 
 
 Case 5: Same as Case 4, except the audience is blind, and the speaker knows this.  
 
  Case 4 is what has been come to be called a bald-faced lie.24 Clearly, there is no 
intent to deceive the audience. Assuming, with the majority of scholars, that intent to 
deceive is a necessary condition on lying, Case 4 is not a case of lying. And, clearly, Case 
5 is a case of lying. Thus, two cases where the speaker has the same (extremely low) 
confidence in what she asserts can differ as to whether the speaker lies. That the WORSE-
OFF view treats Cases 1 and 2 differently is no evidence against my revision.   
Case 325: A’s credence in p is 0.8, B’s is 0.8 in p, and A knows this. A asserts to B 
that p; and A expects this to raise, even slightly, B’s credence in p.26 
 
  Benton’s diagnosis of this case is that, on my account, A lies by “telling the truth,” 
which does, it may seem, pose a problem for my account. But, I have a few ways to 
respond. 
  First, it’s not clear that the case as described would involve an intent to deceive, 
and thus, would not count as a lie (on most views). In Case 3, the speaker knows that she 
and the audience have the same, high credence. Under these circumstances, a reasonable 
person might not think that her assertion would cause any change in the speaker’s credence. 
                                                 
24    Whether or not a bald-faced lie is a lie is a matter of some contention. See, e.g., Sorensen, “Bald-Faced 
Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive”; Lackey, “Lies and Deception”; Stokke, “Lying and 
Asserting”; Fallis, “Are Bald-Faced Lies Deceptive after All?”; Leland, “Rational Responsibility 
and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies”; Keiser, “Bald-Faced Lies.”  
25     (The numbering of the cases is intentional, to match those that appear in Benton 2018.) 
26 Benton, “Lying, Accuracy and Credence,” 197. 
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Keep in mind, while the speaker knows what both of their credences are, and knows they 
are the same, the audience does not. B doesn’t know either (i) what A’s credence is, or (ii) 
that A knows what B’s credence is. It’s plausible that the audience, B, could think that the 
speaker, A, would assert that p even if she had less than .8 credence in p. B will likely think 
that A has some high credence in p, but B could think that A could speak sincerely and yet 
have a lower credence than B does in p. If this is the case, then B will not count A’s having 
said that p as evidence for p, and thus, will not increase her credence. A, knowing all of 
this, then, will not think that B will be epistemically damaged. Thus, while in this case 
WORSE-OFF is met, an extremely plausible, widely-held requirement, intent-to-deceive, 
is not, and so, the speaker has not lied.  
  Second, even accepting that intent to deceive is a necessary condition on lying, one 
might be concerned that WORSE-OFF allows that someone can lie by asserting a 
proposition that they have high credence in—something they believe.  
  Though these cases may occur, they will be rare, and, when they do occur, the 
speaker would be less blameworthy than in the ordinary case of lying because the expected 
epistemic damage will be low. And, that WORSE-OFF is consistent with these kinds of 
cases makes sense given the reason lying is wrong. If we agree that lying is wrong, when 
it is, because it causes the audience to be worse-off, epistemically, then those case in which 
someone is made worse-off, epistemically, are good candidates for lies. This is the case 
even if the speaker asserts a proposition she has high confidence in. 
  Third, I give WORSE-OFF as a necessary condition; it’s consistent to add a further 
necessary condition to assuage those particularly troubled by Case 3. For example: 
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  One lies about p only if one doesn’t believe that p. 
  One lies about p only if one doesn’t have high credence (or a credence of at least 
x) in p.  
I think the burden is on the philosopher who would want to restrict the class of lies to show 
why such a restriction is warranted, but I leave that project to any interested party.  
Benton believes that the above counterexamples show that my revision to the 
traditional account of lying is a bad revision. I’ve argued, above, that all three purported 
counterexamples fail. But, even if they do show that there are problems with my account, 
they do not show that the traditional account is superior. Benton does not address my main 
argument, which is that the belief requirement gets wrong a whole class of cases and does 
not accord with the best explanation for what makes liars blameworthy. The worse-off 
requirement does it better. 
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3 MORAL MARKET DESIGN27 
3.1 Introduction 
People have legal entitlements to act in ways that others regard as morally 
impermissible. When they do, others have a defeasible reason to stop them. Circumstances 
will dictate whether others should try to inhibit such behavior, and, if so, the best method: 
one might convince such people that what they are doing is wrong; one might explain that 
others will dislike them if they persist; one might ask them nicely, or threaten them; or, one 
could pay them.  
 I argue that we ought to pay people to stop behaving in ways we believe are immoral 
but toward which they are morally indifferent. I argue for the creation of a moral market, 
where people buy and sell the cessation of such behavior. Properly regulated, this market 
would have two significant upsides, noted here, and few downsides. First, it would allow 
people to trade in a way that would make them better off. Second, it would bring about a 
moral improvement.  
 Of course, this is a highly theoretical, academic proposal. Before designing a new 
market, experts outside of philosophy need to weigh in.28 I aim merely to draw attention to 
the inefficient allocation of certain entitlements and to offer a framework to address this 
problem. 
                                                 
27 A version of this chapter appeared as Krauss, Sam Fox, “Moral Market Design,” Kansas Journal of Law 
& Public Policy 28(2) (2019): 426–455, of which I am the sole author. 
28 See Ballantyne, “Epistemic Trespassing.”  
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 This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I use the case of the ethical vegetarian to 
motivate the proposal and articulate the positive argument for creating a moral market; 
second, I refine the proposal and set limits to the market; third, I consider several 
objections; fourth, I offer two additional proposals in the same spirit, which those initially 
unconvinced of the desirability of the moral market may find more palatable.  
3.2 Moral Indifference and Allocative Inefficiency 
Moral disagreement is ubiquitous, but it is nevertheless striking that we are 
surrounded by people who believe that morality requires them to act in ways incompatible 
with what we believe morality requires. There is a large literature on the problem of 
disagreement and what to do about it.29 Chiefly, however, this article considers cases of 
disagreement in which one party is morally indifferent toward their own behavior while 
the other party believes that they act impermissibly. This kind of moral disagreement 
allows for both increased economic efficiency and moral progress, so far not discussed.30  
Moral disagreement may be (generally) intractable, and therefore so too the actions 
that follow from disagreeing parties. But when the actions stem from non-moral reasons, 
                                                 
29 See generally Enoch, “How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?” (Arguing that moral 
disagreement does not pose a problem for moral realism); Audi, “Intuition, Inference, and Rational 
Disagreement in Ethics.” (Arguing that intuitionism can allow for rational disagreement); Elga, 
“Reflection and Disagreement.”(arguing for a broadly conciliationist view); McGrath, “Moral 
Disagreement and Moral Expertise.”; Vavova, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism.” 
(Discussing the extent to which moral disagreement gives cause for skepticism); Schoenfield, 
“Permission to Believe.” (Defending a permissive view of epistemic rationality and discussing its 
connections to disagreement); Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” (Arguing for a 
moderate skepticism in light of religious disagreement). 
30 One notable exception is Ord, “Moral Trade.” (Arguing that differences in two parties’ moral views allows 
for trades that constitute moral and prudential improvements over the status quo).  
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the actor can be deterred with financial incentives or in-kind payments. And, while people 
should not allow financial incentives to outweigh moral reasons, financial incentives often 
do outweigh non-moral reasons—innocuously so. One ought not, say, accept money to 
paint a racial slur on a building, but painters earn a living painting buildings they otherwise 
have no reason to. To motivate the proposal for the moral market, consider the case of the 
ethical vegetarian and the omnivore. 
3.2.1 THE VEGETARIAN AND THE OMNIVORE  
Ethical vegetarians believe that eating meat is morally impermissible.31 Omnivores, 
(at least, those who are not akratic), believe that eating meat is morally permissible but not 
obligatory. That is, while omnivores believe that there’s nothing wrong with eating meat, 
they do not believe that they ought to eat meat, just as they do not believe they ought to go 
to a Yankees game, or wear a blue shirt.32 One can say that omnivores are morally 
indifferent toward eating meat and watching baseball and wearing blue shirts. Of course, 
there are non-moral reasons to eat meat, watch baseball, and wear blue. To give up those 
activities might come at a cost, but not a moral cost.  
However much vegetarians detest meat-eating, they cannot just force meat-eaters 
to stop eating meat: people have a legal entitlement to do so. However, there are some 
                                                 
31 Granted, it’s a bit more complicated than this. On the most plausible consequentialist views, it’s not the 
eating of meat that is morally impermissible—it’s killing (and/or causing suffering) that’s wrong. 
I’d like to put this aside and let “eating meat” stand in for whatever it is that ethical vegetarians of 
any stripe think that omnivores do wrong.   
32 With some exceptions. See, e.g., Meyers, “Why It Is Morally Good to Eat (Certain Kinds of) Meat: The 
Case for Entomophagy.”; Bruckner, “Strict Vegetarianism Is Immoral.” (Arguing that under certain 
conditions vegetarianism is immoral). 
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meat-eaters who, for a price, would become vegetarians for a period of time.33 And, 
presumably, there are some people willing to pay that price.34 If one owns the entitlement 
to eat meat, then one can sell that entitlement to the vegetarian. In effect, the vegetarian is 
contractually binding the meat-eater to become a vegetarian.   
Entitlement is a notoriously elusive concept.35 Let entitlement mean the legal ability 
to engage in a behavior or activity. Ignore the distinction between conduct to which people 
have an enumerated right—say, to vote—and conduct that no law currently prohibits, but 
easily could—say, the right to park on a certain street. Thinking about the ability to eat 
meat as an entitlement, and arguing that, in some cases, it ought to be for sale does not 
entail that all entitlements are, or ought to be, alienable or salable.36 One cannot, for 
example, give or sell oneself into slavery.   
It might seem odd to think about buying and selling the entitlement to eat meat. 
After all, people are legally permitted to eat as much meat as they want, so, one might say, 
acquiring someone else’s entitlement does not get them anything. But that is wrong. While 
in some cases of transfer of ownership one acquires a new good, or the ability to engage in 
                                                 
33 If the reader finds this is implausible, consider the many boring, painful, risky things people do for money, 
and that being vegetarian is far easier than many (if not most) of them.  
34 If the reader finds this is implausible, consider: i) that the price some people would be willing to accept 
to become vegetarian might be quite low; ii) that (some) people who donate to People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, for example, do so for this very reason; and iii) that committed vegetarians 
spend money on far less worthwhile things: in 2016 the average American spent $388 on shoes. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Expenditure Survey.” 
35 See Ayres and Balkin, “Legal Entitlements as Auctions,” 704. 
36 See Dagan and Fisher, “Rights for Sale,” 106–124; Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory of 
Property Rights.”  
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a behavior one otherwise could not, here the buyer pays the seller to lose the legal ability 
to perform some behavior. In the meat-eating case, the vegetarian buys the entitlement 
from the omnivore not because the vegetarian wants to eat meat, but precisely because they 
want the omnivore not to.  
A trade on the moral market would make both parties by their own estimation better 
off: the omnivore values the entitlement to eat meat less than the vegetarian values the 
omnivore becoming a vegetarian. Without this trade, some people to whom the entitlement 
was granted will not derive the full value of the entitlement.37 That is, if the entitlement to 
eat meat would be worth $100 on the moral market, but someone values their entitlement 
at only $50, then they are effectively out $50.  
The moral market is not necessarily shielded from regulation. While there is a 
presumption in favor of voluntary transactions, this presumption can be overcome in the 
case of market failure, in which case the state can regulate or prohibit trade.38 The argument 
in favor of trades on the moral market is the same as the argument for trade, generally, with 
the added benefit that it would make things morally better, as well.39 Given certain 
restrictions, trades on the moral market can withstand the objections that are made to limit 
                                                 
37 See Dagan and Fisher, “Rights for Sale,” 96. 
38 For discussion of the presumption of free trade, see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory 
of Property Rights,” 932.; see generally Sunstein, “Incommensurability and Valuation in Law.” 
(Arguing that the government should respect individual autonomy in valuation); Levmore, “Voting 
with Intensity.” (Noting the common justification that voluntary trades increases utility). For 
discussion of government regulation of trade in response to market failure, see, e.g., Cooter, 
“Market Affirmative Action,” 134. For discussion of government prohibition of trade in response 
to market failure, see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,” 933. 
39 For a recent, robust defense of the market, see generally Oman, The Dignity of Commerce. (Arguing that 
well-functioning markets are essential to liberal society).   
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trade in other goods and services, like organs and sex, as well as objections unique to this 
market.  
3.2.2 PAYING FOR BEHAVIOR, AND TYPE-1 CASES 
In the vegetarianism case, the buyer wants the seller to cease immoral behavior. 
One can also imagine cases in which the buyer pays the seller to do something rather than 
to stop doing something. In particular, one can imagine cases where the buyer believes that 
the seller is failing to engage in morally obligatory behavior, and the seller believes that 
they are failing to engage in morally permissible, but not obligatory, behavior. Imagine, 
for example, that environmentalists believe that it is morally obligatory to recycle; others 
believe that it is morally permissible, but not obligatory, to recycle. On the moral market, 
the environmentalist could pay the non-recyclers to recycle.  
These two kinds of cases, paying someone to cease immoral behavior and paying 
someone to engage in morally obligatory behavior, though structurally distinct, are not 
morally distinct. Assume that to fail to engage in morally obligatory behavior just is to act 
immorally. With this taxonomy in mind, note that the two cases share the following 
structure, which I’ll call a “Type-1” case: 
Type-1 Case A believes B’s φ-ing is impermissible. B believes their φ-ing is permissible 
but not obligatory.  
 
Given some assumptions, when the case has the above structure there is reason to 
think that A ought to pay B to stop φ-ing.  
Not only would trades on the moral market increase economic efficiency, but such 
exchanges would make things morally better, at least from the buyer’s perspective, and 
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morally worse according to neither. Consider the perspectives of a buyer and seller, 
respectively, contemplating such a transaction. The buyer believes that the seller is 
engaging in immoral behavior, say, eating meat, and after the trade, would no longer. 
Assuming that the buyer does not give up anything of comparable moral value by spending 
the money, from their perspective this is a moral improvement.40 The seller believes that 
they are engaging in morally permissible, but not obligatory, behavior–eating meat, and 
after the trade, would no longer. From the seller’s perspective, the trade is morally neutral. 
Note two features of the views of the parties: first, from the perspective of the buyer and 
seller in aggregate, the trade constitutes a moral improvement; second, neither party thinks 
that the trade constitutes a moral loss. Granted, that neither party believes things are 
morally worse does not mean that they are not. I’ll address this point in Section 3.3.4.   
If a voluntary transaction can make both buyer and seller better off, from their own 
points of view, and can produce, from their aggregate perspectives, a net moral 
improvement, and neither party thinks there was a moral loss, then barring significant 
market failure it seems that people ought to engage in these kinds of trades. In Section 3.3 
I’ll consider limitations to trades on the moral market and refine the proposal to take them 
into account. In Section 3.4 I’ll consider and respond to several objections. However, none 
of the objections are sufficient to undermine this central piece of the argument: given some 
                                                 
40 For a discussion of sacrifices of comparable moral importance, see Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality,” 231. (Arguing that we ought to help others unless doing so would require us to sacrifice 
something of moral importance comparable to the good we would do by such a sacrifice). 
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assumptions, if Adam believes that Bethany is acting immorally, and Bethany is morally 
indifferent to her own behavior, then Adam should pay Bethany to cease her behavior.  
3.3 Refining the Proposal  
3.3.1 DIFFERENT KINDS OF PERMISSIBLE BEHAVIOR 
I noted that the cases I described had the following, Type-1 structure: 
Type-1 Case A believes B’s φ-ing is impermissible. B believes their φ-ing is permissible 
but not obligatory. 
 
But this case is underspecified: people are not morally indifferent to all behaviors they 
believe are permissible but not obligatory. Consistent with the seller believing that φ-ing 
is permissible but not obligatory, there are several different ways to classify the behavior: 
it could be morally neutral, a morally permissible moral mistake, suberogatory, or 
supererogatory.  
An action is morally neutral just in case either there are no moral reasons that weigh 
in favor or against that action, or the reasons for and against balance each other out.41 
People ought to be morally indifferent toward morally neutral actions. The vegetarian 
example is just this kind of case: omnivores are morally indifferent toward meat-eating. 
Paying someone to cease behavior that they regard as morally neutral was the impetus for 
this project. Both parties benefit, and, in aggregate, from their perspectives, the trade 
                                                 
41 Others have used morally neutral in a similar way. See, e.g., Liberto, “Denying the Suberogatory,” 396. 
Pace, “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations,” 266. Nadelhoffer, “The Butler Problem 
Revisited,” 277. Broome and Morton, “The Value of a Person,” 179. Driver, “The Suberogatory,” 
294. Dale Dorsey discusses the closely related concept, amorality. See Dorsey, “Amorality.”  
(Arguing that, in addition to obligatory, permissible, impermissible, supererogatory, and 
suberogatory actions, there are also amoral actions, which lack moral status). 
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constitutes a moral improvement without either party thinking that things are morally 
worse.  
But not all morally permissible actions are morally neutral. Supererogatory and 
suberogatory actions, and morally permissible moral mistakes, though morally permissible, 
are not morally neutral.42 People have moral reasons to save others from burning buildings, 
and to change seats so a couple can sit together, though it is usually considered morally 
permissible to do neither.43  
Even if the case involves paying people to do things that the recipient believes they 
ought to do, there are reasons to be wary, especially in the moral case.44 There is reason to 
be concerned about paying someone to engage in behavior they believe they have moral 
reason not to, or paying someone to desist from behavior they believe they have moral 
reason to engage in. I exclude from consideration those cases in which the seller would be 
paid to do things they believe they have moral reason not to do, or to cease behavior they 
believe they have moral reason to do.  
                                                 
42 On the supererogatory, see generally Urmson, “Saints and Heroes.” (Arguing for the classification of 
some action as supererogatory, although, without using that name); Horton, “The All or Nothing 
Problem.” (Describing and offering a solution to a dilemma that arises for supererogation). On the 
suberogatory, see Capes, “Blameworthiness Without Wrongdoing.” (Arguing that moral 
permissibility does not entail lack of blameworthiness); Driver, “The Suberogatory.” (Calling 
attention to this class of actions). On morally permissible moral mistakes, see Harman, “Morally 
Permissible Moral Mistakes.” (Arguing for a new classification of actions, morally permissible 
moral mistakes, that we ought not do, for moral reasons, but doing them is not morally wrong).  
43 See Driver, “The Suberogatory,” 291. 
44 See Bowles, The Moral Economy. (Arguing that we ought not incentivize with money conduct people 
know they morally ought to do). 
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3.3.2 TYPE-2 CASES 
So far, discussion has been limited to circumstances where the seller regards the 
behavior they engage in as permissible but not obligatory. But the reader need not limit 
themself to these cases: imagine cases in which the buyer pays the seller to cease behavior 
that the seller believes is morally obligatory, or, equivalently, to engage in behavior that 
the seller believes is morally impermissible. Thus, Type-2 cases:  
Type-2 Case A believes B’s φ-ing is impermissible. B believes their φ-ing is obligatory. 
What should the reader make of these cases? Imagine adherents of two different 
religions, each of which requires that all people belong only to it. Adam believes that 
Bethany’s membership in Religion B (and lack of membership in Religion A) is morally 
impermissible. Bethany believes that her membership in Religion B (and lack of 
membership in Religion A) is morally obligatory. Stipulate that there is some amount such 
that Adam is willing to pay so that Bethany would be willing to convert to Religion A. 
While some people might be unwilling, at any price, to convert, this is not the case for 
everyone, even if they might feel torn, or, after the fact, guilty.  
Many who were persuaded of the desirability of the moral market to handle at least 
some Type-1 cases will balk at Type-2 cases. Sure, they might say, pay someone who does 
not care to switch from Big Macs to veggie burgers, but to pay someone violate their moral 
beliefs is too much!  
 The  proposal, then, is strictly limited to Type-1 cases, and specifically when the 
seller believes that they are engaging in morally permissible, but not morally good, 
behavior. Leave it an open question whether one ought to pay people to cease behavior that 
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they regard as morally impermissible—that is, whether one ought to pay others to stop 
acting akratically. For the remainder of the article, then, I will consider objections only to 
the limited positive proposal that follows: that one ought to pay others to cease behavior 
they believe is impermissible and toward which the sellers are morally indifferent. 
3.3.3 LEGALITY 
Only legal entitlements are traded on the moral market. Two kinds of transactions 
are excluded from consideration: paying people to cease immoral, illegal activity, and 
paying people to engage in morally obligatory, illegal activity. People do not have a legal 
entitlement to engage in illegal activity, and so there is no entitlement to sell. For example, 
on the moral market one cannot pay someone else not to use illegal drugs. No one has a 
legal entitlement to use drugs, so, at least on this framework, they have nothing to sell.45 
Also excluded from the proposal is paying people to engage in illegal activity that the buyer 
believes is morally obligatory. For example, on the moral market one cannot pay someone 
else to, say, remove animals from a research facility.46  
                                                 
45 This is not to say, however, that private citizens have no reason to try to get others to obey the law, and 
it’s not to say that paying people to obey the law is a bad idea. But I don’t endorse this idea, and the 
moral market, as I propose it, cannot handle these kinds of cases. 
46 Here again, this is not to say that private citizens never have a reason to try to get others to break the law, 
and it’s not to say that paying people to break the law is always a bad idea. In some exceptional 
circumstances, perhaps in an unjust society or under an oppressive regime, it may be warranted. But 
I don’t here endorse this idea, and it is not part of the proposal for the moral market. 
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3.3.4 MORAL PROGRESS 
In addition to increased allocative efficiency, the moral market will bring about 
moral progress, according to many views of what that could mean. 
 The proposal endorses trades on the moral market only in a subset of Type-1 cases: 
those in which the seller is morally indifferent toward their own behavior. The vegetarian 
and the omnivore represent a paradigm case. The trade constitutes a moral setback 
according to neither party, and a moral improvement if readers consider their views in 
aggregate.47 If, in aggregate, the parties believe that things are morally better, and no party 
to the transaction believes that things are morally worse, then there is some reason to think 
that things are, actually, morally better off. This is why trades on the moral market would 
lead to moral progress.  
 There are two kinds of objections here. The first is that people’s moral beliefs are 
not reliable, and thus, one cannot infer from the beliefs of the parties that the trade 
constituted a moral improvement to a claim that it did. The second is that, even if people’s 
moral beliefs are, in general, reliable, trades on the moral market will be overrepresented 
by those with unreliable moral beliefs, and therefore a market in entitlements will not lead 
to moral progress.    
  If the objection to this argument is that people, generally speaking, have unreliable 
moral beliefs, then the objection runs far deeper than a mere opposition to the moral 
                                                 
47 See Kornhauser and Sager, “Unpacking the Court.” (Applying concepts of aggregation to judicial 
decision-making). See also List, “The Theory of Judgment Aggregation.” (Providing an introduction 
to the philosophy of judgment aggregation); List and Polak, “Introduction to Judgment 
Aggregation.” (Providing a technical introduction to judgment aggregation.)  
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market.48 If people have unreliable moral beliefs, and therefore should not make trades 
informed by them, it seems also that we have reason to doubt whether they ought to act on 
them. Granted, there is reason to take this objection seriously, but this objection is not 
unique to the moral market proposal; and if it is a good objection, it raises serious doubts 
about whether people have reason to act in accordance with their moral beliefs. 
 But if the objection to this argument is, however, not that people are generally 
unreliable in their moral beliefs, but that unreliable believers would be overrepresented in 
the market, then there might be cause for concern. Perhaps the wealthy will participate 
more in the market, and the wealthy are more likely to have mistaken moral beliefs. But 
why should one think that the wealthy have comparably unreliable moral beliefs? One 
might say that this is because the wealthy tend to act immorally. Or, one might say that the 
wealthy necessarily act immorally—by not giving away their money and thereby becoming 
not-wealthy. However, this explanation is orthogonal to the original objection: even if the 
wealthy act immorally, this does not mean that their moral beliefs are unreliable. It may 
mean, instead, that the wealthy act akratically.  
In addition, even if wealthy buyers are unreliable, the transaction would also require 
unreliable sellers. The proposal, as the I have limited it, does not allow people to act 
akratically. Buyers have to believe the seller is acting immorally, and the seller has to 
believe that what they are doing is permissible but not morally good. The moral market 
                                                 
48 Toby Ord 2015 makes a similar point, at 138:  
Indeed if our views on morality are so misguided that we are systematically pointing away from the 
objective moral requirements, then we would presumably have bigger problems than moral trade, 
and it would be difficult to blame moral trade for our situation as in that case practical rationality, 
moral education, and strength of will, would all be making things worse.  
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does not allow the buyer to pay the seller, or the seller to accept money, to do something 
that either party believes the seller ought not.  
 One last response to this line of objection is regulation. An argument for the moral 
market does not require that every conceivable trade be a good idea; it may require 
regulation. Even the market for bread, for example, is regulated.49  
In a series of articles, Glen Weyl and Eric Posner argue that our system of one-
person, one-vote is inefficient because it does not allow people to register the intensity of 
their preferences, and that this allows an indifferent majority to outweigh a passionate 
minority.50 To solve this problem, Weyl and Posner argue that society should instead adopt 
quadratic voting, a system in which people buy as many votes as they want at the cost of 
the number of votes, squared. Quadratic voting both allows people to register the intensity 
of their preferences and prevents the wealthy from having too much control: assuming one 
dollar per vote, it would cost $10,000 for one person to buy 100 votes, whereas it would 
cost 101 people only $101, in total, to outvote the wealthy voter. Some similar procedure 
could work for regulating the market for entitlements. How exactly this would work is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Writing on a different, but related topic, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein argue that 
when regulatory agencies conduct cost-benefit analyses, they fail to take into account 
                                                 
49  See, e.g., 21 Code of Federal Regulations § 136.110 (2005). (Specifying requirements for bread, rolls, 
and buns.) 
50 See Posner and Weyl, “Quadratic Voting and the Public Good,” 17; Posner and Weyl, “Voting Squared,” 
270. 
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peoples’ moral commitments. They argue that people suffer a welfare loss because of the 
suffering of others, and that this welfare loss ought to be taken into account, as well, in 
regulation.51 Further, they argue that this welfare loss can be estimated by peoples’ 
willingness to pay to avoid the state of affairs they detest.52  
This is all to say that regulation may be a powerful tool in responding to problems 
with the moral market, just as it is for the problems with the market for any good. It is odd, 
though, especially in a regulatory framework, to think about the welfare loss of one person 
because of the damage to another. This oddness has been discussed in the literature on the 
right to destroy: scholars have debated whether the right to destroy persists even if 
destroying property would cause a welfare loss in others, say, by destroying a work of art,53 
or killing a companion animal.54 This theme will be taken up in Section 3.4.3, when I 
discuss an objection to the moral market: that it could lead to extortion.  
 3.4 Objections 
Before  beginning, note that the moral market’s desirability does not require that 
every possible trade be wholly unproblematic: some trades may be prohibitively costly, or 
unwise, or repugnant. Those cases  ought to be either regulated or prohibited. Other trades 
                                                 
51 One might expand their thought about the welfare loss people suffer because of the (knowledge of the) 
pain and suffering of others to include, not only the pain and suffering of others, but knowledge of 
immoral activity, generally speaking.   
52 Posner and Sunstein, “Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis.” They note, however, some reasons 
to be wary of willingness-to-pay analyses, at 9.   
53 See Strahilevitz, “The Right to Destroy,” 828. 
54 See Sachs, “Saving Toby,” 251. 
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may be good on the whole, even if there are costs. As mentioned above, a market for bread, 
for example, does not require the sale of all bread, and does not require that the market be 
problem-free. This project merely provides the framework for encouraging and regulating 
moral market trades; it does not justify every possible trade.  
3.4.1 THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET 
The scholarly literature includes many different arguments for including or 
excluding certain goods and services from trade. The aim in this section is to briefly 
explicate the best exclusionary arguments to show that even if one or more arguments for 
excluding, say, organs, from the market are sound, similar arguments would not work 
against most trades on the moral market. 
 One might object that moral decision-making is one of a number of activities that 
should not be subject to market forces. One might worry that alienating moral deliberation 
violates an important feature of autonomy.55 This objection extends familiar arguments 
against sex work and the sale of human organs, among other exchanges, to moral decision-
making. Scholars have articulated different versions of the anti-commodification and 
coercion objections.56 Michael Sandel, for instance, argues that market values are 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Kuflik, “The Inalienability of Autonomy.” (Discussing the alienability of moral autonomy); 
Barnett, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights.” (Discussing alienable rights and contracts). 
Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” at 215:  
To regard himself as autonomous…a person must see himself as sovereign in deciding what to 
believe and in weighing competing reasons for action. He must apply to these tasks his own canons 
of rationality, and must recognize the needs to defend his beliefs and decisions in accordance with 
these canons. 
56 See Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics. 
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“corrosive” of certain goods. When some goods are subjected to market forces, he writes, 
“markets change the character of the goods and social practices they govern.”57 He 
describes how a market-based system of offsets can make some people think that they can 
absolve themselves from immoral actions, and gives as examples websites for paying for 
offsets for carbon use and for cheating on exams.58 In the latter case, people who cheat on 
exams think they can restore moral balance by making donations.59   
Margaret Jane Radin argues for the market-inalienability of certain goods and 
services, while rejecting both universal commodification and universal 
noncommodification.60 According to Radin, market-inalienability is justified to protect 
those things that are important to personhood.61 
Sandel and Debra Satz both argue that fairness should constrain what markets we 
allow.62 Satz describes the market for organs, for example, in which sellers are often worse 
off for the loss of their organs, and for the (sometimes dangerous) procedure to procure 
them. The sellers are usually poor, and have few choices. Furthermore, markets for organs 
and the like “undermine the social framework needed for people to interact as equals, as 
                                                 
57 Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, 2009, 120.  
58 See Foerster, “Moral Offsetting.” (Offering an illuminating discussion of moral offsetting.) 
59 Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, 2009, 77. 
60 See generally Radin, “Market-Inalienability.” (Arguing that thinking about human flourishing can provide 
insight into the limits of the market). 
61 Radin, Contested Commodities, 193. 
62 Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, 2009, 110–11.  
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individuals with equal standing.”63 Satz says that this is indicative of obnoxious markets.64 
One might, with Sandel and Satz, think that transactions made under coercive 
circumstances, in particular, undermine fairness and equality. 
Subjecting things like sex and organs to market forces may be problematic because 
the sellers in those cases are often coerced. The thought is that buyers of sex and organs 
take advantage of the poverty and desperation of sellers in those markets. The extent of 
coercion is so great, the argument goes, that the would-be sellers are better off if the market 
for such goods did not exist.  
Even if these arguments succeed against the sale of child labor, or organs, or sex, 
they do not succeed against all transactions on the moral market. It is incorrect to 
characterize the trade as the sale of moral autonomy. In the vegetarian case, the meat-eater 
believes that it’s neither morally good nor morally bad to continue eating meat. The seller 
has already made up their mind about the morality of eating meat, and has decided that it 
is morally neutral.  
The heft of any coercion argument is that the seller, but for their dire circumstances, 
would not engage in the trade because of the harmful or degrading nature of the sale, or 
because they lack information. This might be right for many instances of sex work or the 
sale of organs, but in the vegetarianism case, this objection does not work because the seller 
regards the switch to vegetarianism as, at worst, an inconvenience. That the buyer regards 
                                                 
63 Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, 95. 
64 Satz, 93–95.  
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the switch as morally obligatory should not bear on whether the offer of a trade would 
coerce the buyer—at least, not more than any other service that sellers are morally 
indifferent toward, like painting a house or preparing a tax return.  
On the other hand, cases that would involve paying people to do what they believe 
is morally impermissible would be susceptible to these worries. These are Type-2 cases, 
discussed above. They are excluded from the proposal. Even if there were some price that 
Bethany would be willing to accept to stop praying, or to pray to a different god, one might 
think that, because prayer is important to personhood, or human flourishing, or because a 
market to get people to stop praying would be coercive, one ought not facilitate a market 
for this type of exchange.  
3.4.2 DOING THE RIGHT THINGS FOR THE WRONG REASONS 
A Kantian might object that if a seller ceases moral behavior for money, not from 
a sense of duty, then the cessation lacks moral value. So, participating in the market for 
entitlements is not morally good. But first, even if the seller’s action lacks moral value 
because they become vegetarian for money and not, say, because they are convinced by 
Tom Regan,65 the action of the buyer may yet have moral value. The buyer, we might think, 
pays the seller to go vegetarian out of their sense of duty. Thus, even on a Kantian picture, 
it seems that trades on the moral market could have moral value.  
                                                 
65 See generally, Regan, The Case for Animal Rights. (Giving a now-famous rights-based defense of animals 
rights.)  
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Even if the Kantian is not persuaded, a trade’s lacking moral value is a not a reason 
against it. Kantians presumably think that buying a chocolate bar lacks moral value, and 
yet Kantians do not generally object to buying chocolate. A Kantian might press that 
exchanges on the moral market are a violation of the Principle of Humanity.66 But, as 
argued above, if  one constrains the moral market to just those cases in which the seller 
regards their behavior as permissible but not morally good, then it is difficult to see how 
paying someone to become vegetarian constitutes using them as a mere means any more 
than paying them to paint a house. Were the buyer paying the seller to engage in behavior 
that the seller themself regarded as immoral, then a plausible case could be made that the 
exchange violates the Principle of Humanity.  
Others may make similar objections. Sandel’s warning about the market’s corrosive 
effect on some goods could be a serious problem. As he puts it, the presence of financial 
incentives may “crowd out” moral or civic norms.67  
Samuel Bowels is similarly concerned that market values will crowd out moral 
values. He argues that economists and policy-makers are wrong to think that people are 
“entirely self-interested and amoral.” Rather, he argues, there is a substantial body of 
psychological studies that show that while people care about acting ethically, when given 
financial incentives to do so, those financial incentives crowd out the intrinsic moral norms 
                                                 
66 See generally, Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  
67 See Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, 2009, 16; Sandel, “How Markets 
Crowd Out Morals.” 
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people already have.68 Here, crowding out can mean either replacing the intrinsic ethical 
motivation many of us have, or it could mean that our moral decision-making would be 
adversely affected.69 Among other possible explanations,70 Bowles describes “moral 
disengagement,” a phenomenon in which “moral reasons become less salient,” in 
particular, when financial incentives are present.71  
Even if Bowles and Sandel are right that encouraging ethical behavior through 
financial incentives is problematic, the way the proposal is restricted avoids these concerns. 
It may very well be problematic to pay people to behave as they might otherwise, out of 
goodwill, or as they know they ought to. But if the concern is that incentives crowd out 
morals, the morals have to be there in the first place. On the moral market, buyers pay seller 
to cease or engage in behavior toward which the seller is morally indifferent. One cannot 
then say that paying an omnivore to be vegetarian crowds out what otherwise would have 
been moral motives to become vegetarian, because no such motives exist. Thus, while the 
crowding out objection may provide a good reason not to pay people to do what they know 
they ought to do, it does not provide a good reason not to pay people to do what they are 
morally indifferent toward.   
                                                 
68 Bowles, The Moral Economy, 41. 
69 Bowles, 21. 
70 Bowles also mentions dual process theory as an explanation. He says that the presence of incentives 
stimulates deliberation, which, some scholars think, is bad for moral reasoning.  
71 Bowles, The Moral Economy, 96. See generally Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of 
Inhumanities.”; Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action.” (Explaining the 
phenomenon of moral disengagement.) 
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3.4.3 MORAL EXTORTION 
One might be concerned that the moral market creates an opportunity for moral 
extortion. Imagine that an omnivore wants to get higher than market price for their 
entitlement to eat meat, so they artificially inflate its value by threatening to buy hundreds 
of pounds of meat and throw it away unless someone pays them a great deal not to. Or, 
imagine that the non-recycler threatens to rent out the local Hertz’ fleet and let the cars idle 
in the parking lot. Or, the non-theist threatens, not only to fail to pray to God, but to pray 
to the devil. The concern is that by commodifying the entitlement to engage in behavior 
others believe is morally impermissible, the moral market allows the opportunist to engage 
in moral extortion. The opportunist preys on the anxiety that their legally permitted 
behavior will cause others to feel.   
One might think that if  each individual owns the right to engage in legal behavior 
that others find immoral, one can do anything one wants with the entitlement: after all, the 
foregoing has argued that readers should think about it as something they can sell. If this 
were the case, it would be a powerful (though not necessarily decisive) objection against 
the moral market. Fortunately, there is reason to think that this kind of behavior is, or could 
be, illegal.  
It could be, but is unlikely, that moral extortion is, in some cases, extortion as it is 
legally understood, according to federal72 or state law.73 Under the Hobbes Act, extortion 
is the “consensual obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or 
                                                 
72 Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951 (2000).  
73 Model Penal Code § 223.4  (American Law Institute 2017).  
 59 
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” It is often invoked to 
prosecute public officials for corruption. There is reason to think that moral extortion might 
not quite fall under the legal meaning of extortion as it is currently understood: the courts 
would have to interpret “fear” very broadly. Nevertheless, scholars have offered different 
arguments about how this kind of behavior may yet be illegal. Broadly, there is wide 
agreement on the following: a person’s reasons for using their property in a particular way 
can affect whether they are legally allowed to do so.74 As Stephen Sachs puts it, “the law 
may legitimately hold that it is unlawful to threaten maliciously what would, under other 
circumstances, be entirely lawful to do.”75  
Sachs argues for the creation of a new kind of extortion: extortionate destruction. 
He describes the odd case of Toby the Bunny: in 2005, someone made a website with 
photos of his rabbit and threatened to kill and eat him unless people sent him $50,000.76 
While this might appear extortionate, extortion statutes protect people from threats against 
their property. And, while it’s possible that the court could construe the dislike that people 
have of others killing rabbits as “fear,” this would, according to Sachs, be overbroad.77 
Indeed, even if we ought to take seriously the welfare costs of Bethany’s immoral actions 
                                                 
74 See Kelly, “Strategic Spillovers”; Katz, “Spite and Extortion”; Strahilevitz, “The Right to Destroy”; 
Fennell, “Adjusting Alienability”; Perillo, “Abuse of Rights”; Sachs, “Saving Toby.” 
75 Sachs, “Saving Toby,” 260. (Adding that this is what happens in the case of blackmail). 
76 Sachs, 251.  
77 Sachs, 251–52. (“Current extortion statues, however, generally do not prohibit the threatened destruction 
of one’s own property, even if they prohibit endangering property owned by someone else. The law 
thus provides insufficient protection to a variety of resources on which others might place value, 
including historical buildings, treasured paintings, and adorable bunny rabbits.”) 
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on Adam,78 it is not the case that any time someone does something others dislike, even for 
moral reasons, that behavior is or should be illegal. However, when done specifically to 
cause harm, or to get money, what would otherwise have been legal activity, can be illegal.  
Moral externality is not altogether  a new concept. Daniel Kelly discusses what he 
calls “strategic spillovers,” which are negative externalities intentionally generated by a 
party’s “use of property to extract payments from victims in exchange for desisting.”79 He 
describes how opportunistic parties generate strategic spillovers in many areas of law: 
environmental law, intellectual property law, corporate law, legislation and regulation, and 
litigation and settlement. He does not offer one solution to this problem, but indicates that 
the most promising might be the abuse of right doctrine.80 
According to the abuse of right doctrine, while in general people have freedom to 
use their property as they see fit, when owners use their property precisely to cause harm, 
either as a means to extract payment or simply for spite, this constitutes an abuse of the 
right of ownership, and in so doing the owner “exceeds her jurisdiction.” As Larissa Katz 
puts it, “owners lack the jurisdiction to exercise their authority just for the reason that it 
will cause harm to another.”81 
                                                 
78 See Posner and Sunstein, “Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis.” 
79 Kelly, “Strategic Spillovers,” 1644. 
80 See also Kelly, 1710. (Noting that “Unlike the United States, many civil law countries attempt to address 
explicitly the type of opportunism inherent in strategic spillovers.” And continuing, “Under the 
abuse of right doctrine, a court may prohibit an individual from engaging in what would otherwise 
be a valid exercise of a legal right if the person is exercising the right for an illegitimate reason.”) 
81 Katz, “Spite and Extortion,” 1468. 
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In some cases, the courts have found strategic spillovers to be illegal, if not 
extortionate. So-called “spite fences” are just one illustration of this. Generally speaking, 
people can build fences on their property even if their neighbors find them ugly, or block 
their views, or their sunshine. However, when built for the purpose either to spite the 
neighbor, or to extract payment, building them can be illegal.82 Katz argues that the court’s 
willingness to find these practices illegal is both explained and justified by the abuse of 
right doctrine. Even if the abuse of right doctrine is not explicit in the common law, Katz 
and others have argued that the doctrine permeates American law, nevertheless.83  
Even though the prospect of moral extortion is daunting, there is reason to be 
hopeful that this isn’t too great a problem for the moral market. First, in many cases it may 
be illegal, as are spite fences and blackmail. Second, even if not illegal now, many have 
argued that similar cases not currently illegal, ought to be. Were trades on the moral market 
to flourish, there would be increased pressure on courts and legislatures to protect against 
moral extortion. Third, that there are problems with the moral market is not decisive against 
it. Kelly describes the existence of strategic spillovers in many areas of the law, and yet the 
solution to the problem is not to eliminate all of the very many kinds of interactions that 
bring it about.   
                                                 
82 See Kelly, “Strategic Spillovers,” 1667–68; Sachs, “Saving Toby,” 259–60; Fennell, “Adjusting 
Alienability,” 1454–55. 
83 See Perillo, “Abuse of Rights.” 
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3.4.4 UNCONSCIONABILITY 
The proposal excludes both paying someone to engage in and desist from illegal 
activity. The proposal has assumed that contracts on the moral market would be legally 
binding and enforceable. However, some contracts, though legally valid, will not be 
enforced in courts of equity if they are unconscionable.84 While not precisely defined, a 
contract is said to be unconscionable if “it was ‘such as no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the 
other[.]’”85 The court employs a two-pronged test to determine whether a contract 
provision is unconscionable—it tests for both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.86 The former tests for unfairness in the way the contract came about; 
the latter tests for unfairness in the exchange itself. Unconscionability has been invoked in 
instances of vastly unequal bargaining power,87 where all of the parties offering the service 
include the same clause,88 and where it provides for under-compensation in the case of a 
                                                 
84 See Shiffrin, “Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation,” 207. (Defending the 
doctrine against a charge that it is overly paternalist); see also Bagchi, “Distributive Justice and 
Contract,” 193. (“[Principles of distributive justice] are among the moral considerations that 
appropriately inform rules of validity, interpretation, and remedy.” He continues, “[c]ontracts that 
take place against a backdrop of distributive injustice may be subject to further…constraints.”)  
85 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. b (American Law Institute 1981) (citing Hume v. United 
States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)). 
86 See McCullough, “Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept,” 781. (Providing an excellent 
overview of the topic.) 
87 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (American Law Institute 2018) (“The principle is one of the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise . . . . ”) 
88 Williston on Contracts, sec. 18:13. 
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breach.89 It has also been invoked where one of the contracting parties doesn’t know what 
they’re doing.90 In general, contracts have been found to be unconscionable where they are 
grossly unfair.91  
Some trades on the moral market might be susceptible to conscionability worries, 
but the likelihood is low, both because the standard for unconscionability is high, and 
because the market is limited to those trades in which the seller believes they are being 
paid to do something toward which they are morally indifferent. Where the contract is 
abhorrent to the court, it may, for unconscionability reasons, refuse to enforce the terms. 
Given the constraints enumerated, there is reason to think that these cases will be rare.  
In addition, the unconscionability doctrine may be a tool for regulating the unsavory 
borders of the moral market. Some argue that the doctrine reflects society’s unwillingness 
to endorse socially destructive agreements, especially when those agreements may 
undermine equality.92 Debra Satz makes a related point, arguing that the threat to equality 
is one indication of an “obnoxious market.”93 And, it is well-documented both that the 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., Fried, “The Ambitions of Contract as Promise,” 27. (Citing U.C.C. § 2-718 cmt. 1. (American 
Law Institute 2018)). 
90 Williston on Contracts, sec. 18:8; Radin, Contested Commodities, 228.  
91 See Cornell, “A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law,” 1146; Shiffrin, 
“Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation,” 209. 
92 See, e.g., Bagchi, “Distributive Injustice and Private Law,” 109; Shiffrin, “The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise,” 752. 
93 Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, 95. (Explaining that “[t]he operation of these markets can 
undermine the social framework needed for people to interact as equals, as individuals with equal 
standing”); see also, Quong, “Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal Opportunities,” 
57. ("I believe that principles of justice should have a fundamentally different purpose, which is to 
create a system of regulation for political society that enables all persons to live as free and equal 
citizens."). 
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courts are increasingly willing to refuse to enforce contracts as unconscionable, and that 
more litigants are bringing claims.94 Parties are less likely to form contracts they doubt 
courts will enforce. 
3.4.5 THE WEALTH EFFECT 
The market allocates resources more efficiently than their initial allocation. When 
Adam values Bethany’s entitlement to eat meat more than she does, a trade leads to greater 
efficiency (absent market failure). And, intensity of preference determines the allocation 
of goods: the person who would derive the most from a good ends up with it, at least in 
theory. But, one might worry that, as Saul Levmore puts it, “wealth effects might dominate 
preference intensities.”95 Call this the wealth effect.96  
Of course, the wealth effect is not limited to the moral market. It is problematic, 
also, in the market for concert tickets, health care, and diamond jewelry. Is it then, 
especially problematic in a way that constitutes an objection to the proposal? The proposal 
is already limited to cases where the buyer pays the seller to cease behavior toward which 
the seller is morally indifferent. Thus, one need not worry that the wealth effect would 
induce a poor seller to do something they believe they ought not. Perhaps, then, the worry 
                                                 
94 See McCullough, “Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept,” 786–87. 
95 Levmore, “Voting with Intensity,” 160. 
96 See Sunstein, “Incommensurability and Valuation in Law,” 849; Dagan and Fisher, “Rights for Sale,” 98–
99; Levmore, “Voting with Intensity,” 118. (“Where wealth differentials are present, A might buy 
B’s vote (if legally permitted to do so) even though B is an equal or higher valuing user of that vote. 
And wealthy people like A might systematically favor different political outcomes than would 
people with endowments more like B’s, so that there is at least an argument for barring trades despite 
the fact that the buyer and seller are made better off than before. This argument applies to some but 
not most other inalienable commodities.”) 
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is that the wealth effect will crowd out poor buyers. That this is unfair is neither unique to 
the moral market nor a good objection to it. Poor buyers are crowded out from many 
markets, after all.  
Perhaps the worry is that the buyers will be comparably wealthy, and that the 
wealthy, on average, have impoverished moral beliefs. It is unclear why we should think 
this is the case. Any explanation that makes reference to the wealthy’s poor behavior might 
be better explained by enhanced opportunity to act akratically.  
The best objection invoking the wealth effect is that the wealthy would have 
comparably greater control of the moral landscape, which is inegalitarian even if they are 
no less likely to have the correct moral views.97 Note that this seems to be what happens 
already.98 And, while many charitable donations go toward aid, such as food, medicine, 
disaster relief, and the like, this is not the case for all charities. Consider any charitable 
organization that, in part or in whole, is devoted to changing people’s minds. If the wealth 
effect is problematic for the moral market, it seems similarly problematic for at least some 
kinds of tax-deductible charitable giving.  
 However, the proposal for a moral market is not a proposal for an unregulated 
market. The market ought to be limited—to exclude, for example, paying people to do 
things they believe they ought not, and to exclude those cases likely to involve coercion. 
                                                 
97 See Stilz, “Is the Free Market Fair?,” 432. 
98 See generally, Mayer, Dark Money. (Describing the machinery of lobbying by America’s wealthiest 
residents). 
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As Saul Levmore writes, “…there are ways of limiting wealth effects, and clever ideas for 
limited markets may soon begin to surface.”99 
 As discussed in Section 3.3.4, quadratic voting could work as a check on the 
influence of the wealthy, while at the same time allowing people to register the intensity 
of their preferences. As will be discussed in Section 3.5.2, market design may prevent some 
of the wealth effect: markets for kidneys, for example, operate without money, and we are 
all, roughly speaking, equally endowed with kidneys. As Tsilly Dagan and Talia Fisher 
emphasize, imposing different kinds of inalienability mechanisms can promote efficiency 
while blunting the effects of inequality. They suggest a modified inalienability rule, 
unrestricted barter, for school vouchers, for example.100 Further methods of regulation 
include progressive taxation on trades on the moral market, or transfer payments.  
3.4.6 TRANSACTION COSTS 
There is reason to wonder whether this proposal is feasible, given transaction costs. 
Finding willing buyers and sellers and drawing up and enforcing contracts might make 
these trades too expensive. If a buyer pays a meat-eater to stop eating meat, how will they 
know whether the seller honored the contract? Call this the enforcement problem. That this 
problem exists, however, is not decisive against the moral market. That some trades will 
be too costly does not undermine the proposal altogether. Transaction costs make lots of 
trades that would otherwise be wise, unwise.  
                                                 
99 Levmore, “Voting with Intensity,” 160. 
100 Dagan and Fisher, “Rights for Sale,” 114–16. 
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For some trades the enforcement problem would be small. Imagine a trade where 
the buyer pays the seller to go to church. Enforcement would be a matter of taking 
attendance, or checking in on one’s phone using GPS tracking. Generally speaking, then, 
trades on the moral market ought to be limited to those cases in which the transaction costs 
are not prohibitive. I discuss ways to decrease transaction costs in Section 3.5.1.  
3.5 Two Similar Proposals 
If the moral market is a good idea, one would have to come up with a plan. I’m 
inclined to punt to entrepreneurs, choice architects, and the like.101 However, I anticipate 
that many will dislike the proposal, perhaps not only because of objections to specific parts 
of the argument, but rather because of a general dislike toward the nature of the proposal: 
paying people to behave how they ought to. The remainder of the article, then, will consist 
of two, similar proposals, in the same spirit, but which may be more palatable for those put 
off by the idea of selling entitlements. 
3.5.1 PAY TO PRAY 
Instead of paying people to cease immoral behavior, one might instead pay people 
to do the thing that would convince them to cease immoral behavior. For example, the 
vegetarian, instead of paying the omnivore to give up meat, could pay the omnivore to read 
Animal Liberation,102 or watch a documentary about animal agriculture, in the belief and 
hope that some people would thereby become convinced to become vegetarian.  Note that 
                                                 
101 See generally Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness. 
(Arguing that because people behave in predictably irrational ways, those with power can change 
defaults and thereby make better choices easier to make).  
102 Singer, Animal Liberation. 
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this tactic is employed by VegFund, which, provides money to animal rights groups to pay 
people to watch videos of the workings of animal agriculture.103 Mercy for Animals and 
Compassion for Animals have also employed this tactic.104 Arguably, this is also part of 
the motivation for Birthright Israel, an organization that takes young Jews on a free trip to 
Israel  to “…motivate young people to continue to explore their Jewish identity and support 
for Israel….”105 
 This method would be a valuable tool especially in cases where it may be 
impossible to pay someone to do what we believe is morally obligatory. For example, some 
believe that it is morally obligatory to convert to Christianity. However, these same people 
might believe that conversion requires, say, belief that Christ is the lord and savior, and 
that, because belief is involuntary, you can’t simply pay people to be Christian. But, one 
could pay someone else to do the things that would maximize that person’s chance of 
acquiring the necessary beliefs, and then, converting: say, attending church services, or 
reading the Bible.  
If someone who hands out religious literature thinks that someone’s reading it will 
increase their chance of converting, then increasing the percent of people who read it would 
presumably increase the number of converts. For example, outside my office, from time to 
time a member of a local church hands out granola bars wrapped in paper on which Bible 
                                                 
103 VEGFUND, https://vegfund.org/category/grant-programs/paid-per-view-ppv/ 
104 Nathan Runkle, Mercy For Animals, “Farm to Fridge Inspires Students to Boycott Factory Farm 
Cruelty.” 
105 “Our Story,”, Birthright Israel. [https://perma.cc/6MGE-USUK]. 
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verses and the time and location of church services are written. Each time a student takes 
a granola bar, they are being paid with a snack to have to at least glance at a Bible verse 
and information about the church service. This church member must believe that people 
will be more inclined to read the note if it is wrapped in a granola bar. On the same quad, 
a student group offers an electronic coupon for a free coffee to any student who sends, as 
a text message to the group, a “question you have for God.” The student thereby joins the 
mailing list, and, perhaps, gets an answer to their question, presumably from a student in 
the group. Here, the group is paying students with drinks to be exposed to their emails, in 
the hope that some students will become interested, and join. And perhaps, convert.  
 The weakness of this alternative proposal is that it does not guarantee compliance. 
On the moral market, compliance is contractual. However, this proposal does have several 
benefits. First, it is a good alternative when it is not possible to pay someone to engage in 
the desired behavior, itself, as in the religion case, above. Second, it more closely resembles 
the deliberative process some might feel should uniquely determine the means by which 
we make moral decisions.106  
Not only this, but the buyer might have reason to believe the change will be longer-
lasting. If the buyer pays someone to become a vegetarian for a week, the seller has no 
reason to continue after the contract expires. However, if the seller is paid to read 
                                                 
106 But see generally Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. 
(Arguing that there is reason to doubt that our moral beliefs are formed exclusively through 
deliberative processes.) 
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arguments in favor of vegetarianism, there is a greater likelihood that some percent of 
sellers will become vegetarians for longer than they would have, otherwise.  
Third, the transactions costs would likely be lower: imagine the difference between 
tracking compliance on whether someone remains a vegetarian for a week, on the one hand, 
and whether they have read a book or watched a film, on the other. On a website, it would 
be easy to provide an article or film about vegetarianism, or the environment, or 
Christianity, and then administer a quiz to test understanding. Certainly Silicon Valley 
could create such a platform. Or, one could use existing infrastructure and methodology. 
Human Resources and IT offices routinely provide training through videos about various 
company policies: harassment, FERPA compliance, copyright, etc. Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, for example, is routinely used to find and pay people willing to participate in all sorts 
of tasks. 
For a forum in which to present the information, Reddit’s “Change My View” 
might provide a model.107 On this website, someone poses a question, and then various 
commentators give arguments for or against. People then indicate if they change their 
minds. It has roughly half a million subscribers.108 This shows that some people are willing, 
for free, to be convinced that they are mistaken.  
 Pay to Pray more closely resembles the way we normally try to convince people to 
change their views. It is difficult, however, to get people to listen; the attention of the public 
is a valuable commodity, after all. By compensating people for their time, they would 
                                                 
107  “Change My View (CMV) • r/Changemyview.” 
108 “/r/changemyview metrics,” [https://perma.cc/7T4F-3VBL]. 
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theoretically be more willing to engage in a deliberative practice similar to the one that the 
buyer engaged in, initially. 
3.5.2 MARKET DESIGN 
For those opposed to paying others to engage in or desist from behavior, for moral 
reasons, alternative market design might yield an answer. Economists have written 
extensively on repugnance and the way that it has and continues to constrain markets. 
Repugnance is meant to reflect, as Julio Jorge Elias calls it, the “yuck factor” and is distinct 
from a belief that the good or service traded would cause harm, as it might with some drugs, 
or guns.109 Alan Roth offers repugnance as the explanation for California’s ban on horse 
meat, for example.110 Thus, an argument that a market in some good would make people 
better off is not sufficient to overcome the repugnancy objection. In some cases, the 
transactions are repugnant precisely because of the introduction of money. Roth writes that, 
although transactions can be repugnant for different reasons, “[o]ne often-noted regularity 
is that some transactions that are not repugnant as gifts and in-kind exchanges become 
repugnant when money is added.”111 Sometimes, then, the repugnance can be overcome 
through strategic market design, for example, by replacing financial transactions with in-
kind payments.112 This has happened in the market for kidneys.  
                                                 
109 Elias, “The Role of Repugnance in the Development of Markets,” 234. 
110 Roth, “Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets,” 37–38. 
111 Roth, 44. 
112 Roth, 52. (Noting that while an article suggesting modest payments for organ donation received a 
negative reaction, his proposal for kidney exchange did not). 
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 Thousands of Americans die every year while waiting for kidneys.113 While under 
some conditions people can donate organs, their sale is prohibited in the United States.114 
Were there a legal market for kidneys, fewer people would die for want of a transplant. 
The lack of a (legal) market is problematic not only for people who have no willing donors, 
but also for those in need of an organ with willing but medically incompatible donors. 
Economists designed a market without money to solve the problem of willing but 
incompatible donors, without changing the law.  
“Kidney exchanges” allow a workaround to the repugnancy problem. In a one kind 
of exchange, a paired donation, Patients A and B each have willing but medically 
incompatible donors. Through a database, doctors determine that A’s donor is compatible 
with B, and B’s donor with A’s, and carry out the surgeries accordingly. Thus, it is as if 
A’s donor has given to A, when in fact their kidney went to B. This solves two problems: 
first, it allows people who otherwise could not to donate organs to their family members; 
second, it does so without using money.115 In another kind of exchange, a non-directed 
donor gives a kidney and the reciprocity comes at a future, uncertain time, from an 
uncertain source—when a compatible kidney becomes available, their friend or relative is 
                                                 
113 UCSF, “The Kidney Project.” In 2014, over 100,000 patients were on the transplant waitlist, and only 
roughly 17,000 donor kidneys were available. 
114 National Organ Transplant Act, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984). Using Rose-Ackerman’s terminology, organs are 
controlled with a modified inalienability rule because they can be given, but not sold. In contrast, 
votes are controlled with a pure inalienability rule, because one can neither sell nor give away their 
vote (at least in elections for government positions).  
115 See Roth, “What Have We Learned from Market Design?,” sec. III; Roth, “Repugnance as a Constraint 
on Markets,” 45–52.  
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entitled to it.116 The chain could involve a large number of donations. Alvin Roth explains 
it this way:  
…exchanges could be a cycle of incompatible patient-donor pairs of any size such 
that the donor in the first pair donated a kidney to the patient in the second, the 
second pair donated to third, and so on until the cycle closed, with the last pair 
donating to the first.117  
 
 Kidney exchange might provide a model for getting around repugnancy worries 
about the moral market. Rather than buying and selling entitlements, people could trade 
them through either paired or chain “donations.” If the vegetarian cannot buy the 
omnivore’s entitlement to eat meat, they could, instead, trade, either through a paired 
donation, if the two parties are compatible, or through a chain donation, if they are not. 
There might be something that the vegetarian does that the omnivore believes is morally 
impermissible and toward which the omnivore is morally indifferent.118  
 This is all meant just by way of example, and not as advocacy for a particular kind 
of market design. Trades are a kind of payment, of course, but they get around some 
repugnancy problems, and might be a good response to an objection that one might have 
thought inherent to the moral market.119  
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Woodle et al., “Ethical Considerations for Participation of Nondirected Living Donors in 
Kidney Exchange Programs,” 1461. 
117 Roth, “Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets,” 86.  
118 Choi, Gulati, and Posner, “Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage,” 292. (Making a similar 
proposal to alleviate the kidney shortage by proposing trading kidneys for non-kidney altruistic 
donations.) 
119 See, e.g., Hasen, “Vote Buying,” 1339. (Describing this feature of Congressional logrolling).  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper presents what some may consider a radical proposal: that people ought 
to pay others to do what they themselves believe others ought to do. In some ways, though, 
the view is not all that radical—people pay others to do what they want them to do all the 
time. Properly limited, and regulated, the moral market would allow parties to trade in a 
way that makes them better off, and, according to at least one party, things would be 
morally better. In addition, one has reason to believe the market would contribute to actual 
moral progress. The intuition that moral decision-making ought not be commodified is, in 
this author’s view, the right one. However, the kinds of trades permitted by the proposal 
cannot properly be described as paying someone to give up their moral autonomy. Paying 
someone to do something they are morally indifferent toward is as common a feature of 
the market as the sale of bread.  
 As said at the outset, the proposal is highly speculative. The purpose of this paper 
is to draw attention to the inefficiency of one kind of entitlement, and to suggest a 
framework for addressing it. That this proposal is imperfect, or that the moral market would 
have problems, is not definitive against it.  
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4 AGAINST THE ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY OF STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS  
4.1 Introduction 
We should take into account the relevant evidence. This is a general principle in 
epistemology and in evidence law scholarship, and is expressly stated in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.120 Where the evidence is, or is likely to be, inaccurate, it should be discounted 
or excluded from consideration. And the same where the evidence is accurate but likely to 
mislead.121 In some cases, there is controversy about what kinds of evidence are likely to 
be inaccurate, or likely to mislead. But, it is uncontroversial that when evidence is 
inaccurate or misleading, this provides a strong if not decisive reason for excluding or 
discounting that evidence: reasoning with such evidence inhibits factfinding. Call these 
reasons for exclusion accuracy-based epistemic reasons. At other times, the weight we 
accord evidence is not determined solely by accuracy-based reasons, but for what might be 
referred to as policy reasons. For example, some philosophers have argued that we ought 
to defer, against the evidence, to friends.122 In a similar vein, stereotyping may be morally 
objectionable, even if it is not (always) evidentially deficient.  
                                                 
120 See,e.g., Pundik, “The Epistemology of Statistical Evidence,” 137.; “Federal Rules of Evidence” (FRE) 
Rule 402 (Allowing all relevant evidence unless expressly proscribed).  
121 For example, FRE Rule 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence “…if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury…” 
122 See, e.g., Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship”; Keller, “Friendship and Belief.” (Arguing that we 
should sometimes defer, against the evidence, to friends). But see Kawall, “Friendship and 
Epistemic Norms.” (Responding to Stroud and Keller).  
 76 
In the literature on the use of statistical evidence in trials, the consensus view among 
legal scholars and philosophers is that statistical evidence should not be, on its own, 
sufficient for conviction in a criminal case or a judgment in a civil case. With few notable 
exceptions,123 neither legal scholars nor philosophers give accuracy-based epistemic 
reasons for excluding or discounting statistical evidence. For the most part, philosophers 
have given non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons. That is, statistical evidence is deficient 
in some epistemic virtue, but this deficiency is not one that would inhibit fact-finding. And, 
for the most part, legal scholars have given policy-based reasons.  
I argue that we should not discount statistical evidence, as scholars have claimed 
and as the courts have sometimes held. I argue that statistical evidence should be sufficient, 
on its own, for conviction in a criminal trial or a judgment in a civil trial.124  I start with a 
presumption that all relevant evidence should receive its due. The main claim of this paper 
is that the considerations scholars give in favor of statistical evidence’s insufficiency do 
not overcome this presumption. Even if the considerations on offer are compelling, the cost 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., Di Bello, “Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?” 
124 I’m not the first person to say that non-accuracy based epistemic reasons don’t lead neatly to a conclusion 
that statistical evidence should not be sufficient for a finding of legal responsibility. See, especially, 
Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher, “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge”; 
Enoch and Fisher, “Sense and ‘Sensitivity’: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical 
Evidence.” (Giving policy-based reasons for thinking that statistical evidence’s insensitivity 
provides a perverse incentive to wrongdoers in some cases, and arguing, generally, that the courts 
should be more concerned with factfinding than with knowledge); Pundik, “The Epistemology of 
Statistical Evidence,” 122, fn 27: “Proponents of the distinction [between admissible and 
inadmissible statistical evidence] need to provide a more refined distinction between acceptable and 
problematic statistical evidence, together with some explanation as to why any differential treatment 
of objectionable statistical evidence should not apply to types of statistical evidence they consider 
acceptable.”; Pundik, “What Is Wrong with Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to Establish an 
Epistemic Deficiency,” 463. (Arguing that none of the epistemic reasons “successfully establish[] 
an epistemic deficiency from which (only) statistical evidence suffers.”) 
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of demoting statistical evidence is substantial. Broad pronouncements about epistemic 
desiderata, I think, draw attention away from the purpose of the trial, which is, at bottom, 
a factfinding mission.125 Of course, this is not the only goal—if it were, then the 
Exclusionary Rule, which renders probative evidence inadmissible if it was obtained 
unlawfully, would not exist. But often the discussions seem to miss the cost to accuracy, 
which in turn is a cost to victims of crimes, their families, to future victims, and to those 
who suffer torts. In an article on this topic, Duncan Pritchard makes a claim about error in 
trials: “In short, we want a criminal justice system that excludes high levels of risk of 
wrongful conviction, where risk is understood modally rather than probabilistically.”126 It 
is unclear why anyone affected by the risk of wrongful conviction would prefer a modal 
conception of risk, even if it has theoretical virtues. One would think that the people 
involved with and affected by trials would care primarily about accuracy. The Court has 
alluded to this many times.127 And, in the absence of sufficient countervailing reasons to 
prize non-accuracy-based epistemic virtues over accuracy, it’s difficult to see why those 
reasons ought to prevail.  
                                                 
125 “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of the truth.” (Tehan v. U.S. 383 U.S. 406, 416)(1966)) 
Quoted in Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, 2. 
126 Pritchard, “Risk,” 454. 
127 “Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in criminal prosecutions is heavily 
handicapped. It must be justified by an over-riding public policy expressed in the Constitution or 
the law of the land.” Nardone v. U.S., 308 US 388 (1939) at 340; “…this admittedly drastic and 
socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory 
protections.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) at 442; “The exclusionary rule generates 
‘substantial social costs[.]” Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586 (2006) at 591. 
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The paper is organized as follows. First, I describe the problem statistical evidence 
presents in the law. In brief, the following sort of dilemma arises: Factfinders (the judge or 
jury) in criminal and civil trials are charged with reaching a verdict if the evidence 
presented meets a particular standard of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt, in criminal 
cases, and preponderance of the evidence, in civil trials. It seems that purely statistical 
evidence can suffice for just such a level of certainty in a variety of cases where our 
intuition is that it would nonetheless be wrong to convict the defendant, or find in favor of 
the plaintiff, on merely statistical evidence. So, we either have to convict with statistical 
evidence, in spite of an intuition that this is unsettling, or else explain what (dispositive) 
deficiency statistical evidence has.  
Second, I discuss the reasons philosophers give for statistical evidence’s 
deficiency—mostly non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons. In general, the arguments have 
the following form: For evidence to be sufficient for knowledge or belief, it has to have 
one or another epistemic property. Statistical evidence lacks this property for one reason 
or another. The factfinder must have the relevant belief, or knowledge, in order to convict 
a defendant or award a judgment to a plaintiff. Therefore, statistical evidence cannot be 
sufficient for conviction or a judgment. I don’t argue that the relevant philosophers are 
mistaken about statistical evidence’s lacking the properties they identify. But I argue that 
these philosophers focus too much on the first two premises and not enough on the third—
that the right kind of belief or knowledge is necessary in the legal context. In perhaps the 
most egregious instance of this, Sarah Moss argues that criminal defendants have a right 
that the jury know that they are guilty and that statistical evidence, itself, is not sufficient 
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for that kind of knowledge.128 Even if we grant the second conjunct, which is part of the 
argument of her sophisticated and well-received book, there is no good reason to accept 
the first. And Moss offers no such compelling reason.  
In the evidence law literature, scholars mostly give what I’ve called “policy” 
reasons against the sufficiency of statistical evidence for conviction or judgment: it 
undermines a defendant’s right to be treated as an individual;129 it can be difficult to 
determine which reference class someone ought to be considered a member of;130 it requires 
an overt admission of error;131 and, for legitimacy reasons, the public has to be able to treat 
the verdict as a conclusion about something that happened, which, we have reason to think, 
may not be the case if statistical evidence is sufficient for conviction.132 I won’t discuss 
these at length in the paper—my focus is on non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons. In large 
part, some of the policy reasons require a kind of empirical analysis that is, for me, either 
                                                 
128 “According to my account, defendants have the right to be convicted on the basis of nothing less than 
knowledge.” Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, 215. 
129 Wasserman, “The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken Liability,” 943. (But noting that 
where the statistical evidence does not “involve an inference to the defendant’s conduct from the 
frequency of similar conduct,” as in, e.g., fingerprint analysis, to that extent the statistical evidence 
may be unproblematic.)  
130 Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson, “Is It a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class?” 
131 “There is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, 
‘I believe there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of 
sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public’s—and my own—
safety.” Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,” 1372, quoted in 
Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,” 337. 
132 Nesson, “The Evidence or the Event?”  
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too speculative without data or beyond the scope of this project, otherwise. Moreover, it 
involves a sort of weighing of costs and benefits that I’m not prepared to undertake.133 
Third, I discuss the way in which the philosophical literature is out of touch with 
the legal reality—that outside of toy cases discussed (though some are based on actual 
cases), the courts allow statistical evidence to be sufficient in a variety of contexts. For 
example, in the civil context, statistical evidence can be sufficient where either the harm is 
collective or else it is impossible to tell who, exactly, is responsible for the harm. Slightly 
more controversially, statistical evidence is used, decisively, in bail and sentencing 
determinations. Of course, that the practice exists in other contexts does not itself justify 
the practice, but to the extent that these practices have become accepted for principled 
reasons, it does. The various considerations I advance lead to the conclusion that when it 
comes to naked statistical evidence, philosophers who argue for its insufficiency are 
grasping at straws.  
4.2 The Problem Statistical Evidence Poses in Trials 
4.2.1 THE PARADOX 
As a rough approximation, “statistical evidence” in the legal epistemology 
literatures refers to evidence from which the fact-finder draws a statistical inference to the 
defendant’s guilt or liability. While it may be specious to distinguish “statistical evidence” 
                                                 
133 As Koehler and Shaviro write, the determination “of whether, on balance, greater use of overtly 
probabilistic evidence and methods at trial is desirable…depends on the value attached to specific 
policy concerns other than verdict accuracy.” Koehler and Shaviro, “Veridical Verdicts: Increasing 
Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods,” 248. 
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from other kinds of evidence, I’ll stick to this terminology for consistency’s sake. Scholars 
in this literature distinguish between individualized, or particularized, evidence, on the one 
hand, which is said to be “about” the defendant, and statistical evidence, on the other, 
which is not.  Base rates, for example, are described as “statistical evidence.” More 
philosophically sophisticated scholars working in this area have pointed out this suspect 
classification of different kinds of evidence.134 
The statistical evidence is usually about a reference class of which the individual is 
a member. For example, assume that we have no knowledge of Simon’s shoe preferences. 
But he is a late-twenties male, and we have robust data about the shoe-buying practices of 
late-twenties males. Thus, we have statistical evidence of Simon’s shoe preference, even 
though we don’t know anything about Simon, individually. So, without more information, 
we can infer from the data something about Simon’s shoe preferences. In contrast, if Simon 
had made a statement about his love of Nikes, then we would have direct evidence.  
In the legal context, a conviction or a finding is warranted when the government or 
plaintiff meets the relevant standard of proof. And it seems that statistical evidence, 
sometimes, is sufficient to meet this burden.135 Why then, does it seem inappropriate to 
                                                 
134 See, e.g., Pardo, “The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide,” 262, fn 128; Shaviro, “Statistical-
Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice,” 530 (Challenging this distinction and arguing 
that it is ill-defined in the literature). Ron Allen makes a more strident comment: “the assumption 
that there are two qualitatively distinct types of evidence, statistical and non-statistical, is essentially 
false.” Allen, “On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of the 
‘Naked Statistical Evidence’ Debate, the Meaning of ‘Evidence,’ and the Requirement of Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 1093. Judge Posner in Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 358, 360 (7th 
Cir. 1998): “All evidence is probabilistic—statistical evidence merely explicitly so.” (cited in 
Koehler 2002, 401, fn 165). 
135 See Pardo, “The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide,” 253.:  
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convict or find as the evidence suggests, when the evidence is statistical in nature? One 
scholar writes that doing so would be “dubious.”136  In the relevant literature, a few cases 
have come to be canonical representations of the problem. I’ll give two civil cases and one 
criminal case, to illustrate :  
Blue Bus 
Suppose it is late at night…and an individual’s car is hit by a bus. This 
individual cannot identify the bus, but she can establish that it is a blue bus, 
and she can prove as well that 80 percent of the blue buses in the city are 
operated by the Blue Bus Company, that 20 percent are operated by the Red 
Bus Company, and that there are no buses in the vicinity except those 
operated by one of those two companies….In these circumstances can the 
plaintiff recover in civil litigation against the Blue Bus Company, or, if 
not…then why not?137 
Gatecrasher 
Consider a case in which it is common ground that 499 people paid for 
admission to a rodeo, and that 1,000 are counted on the seats, of whom A is 
one. Suppose no tickets were issued and there can be no testimony as to 
whether A paid for admission or climbed over the fence. So there is a .501 
probability, on the admitted facts, that he did not pay. The conventionally 
accepted theory of probability would apparently imply that in such 
circumstances the rodeo organizers are entitled to judgment against A for 
the admission money, since the balance of the probability would lie in their 
favor. But is seems manifestly unjust that A should lose when there is an 
agreed probability of as high as .499 that he in fact paid for admission.138 
                                                 
What makes the examples ‘paradoxical’ is that the evidence appears on its face to surpass the 
applicable standard of proof and, yet, the judgment of most people is that the evidence is insufficient 
to prove liability or guilt. This apparent inconsistency between what the applicable legal rules appear 
to require, on the one hand, and judgments about what the correct result ought to be, on the other, 
creates a tension that calls out for explanation.  
136 See Gardiner, “Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence,” 3. 
137 Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, 82. (This case is modeled on Smith v. Rapid Transit, 
Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945)). 
138 Kaye, “The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories,” 101. (This case was originally presented in 
Cohen, The Probable and the Provable.).  
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Prison Yard 
In an enclosed yard are twenty-five identically dressed prisoners and a 
prison guard. The sole witness is too far away to distinguish individual 
features. He sees the guard, recognizable by his uniform, trip and fall, 
apparently knocking himself out. The prisoners huddle and argue. One 
breaks away from the others and goes to a shed in the corner of the yard to 
hide. The other twenty-four set upon the fallen guard and kill him. After the 
killing, the hidden prisoner emerges from the shed and mixes with the other 
prisoners. When the authorities later enter the yard, they find the dead guard 
and the twenty-five prisoners. Given these facts, twenty-four of the twenty-
five are guilty of murder.139 
 
 In the above cases, the relevant standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence, 
generally thought to mean more likely than not, in the civil case; beyond a reasonable 
doubt, in the criminal case—seem to be met.140 And yet, the intuition of most scholars, and, 
in some cases, the courts, is that it has not been. Describing the Blue Bus case, for example, 
Sean Sullivan writes, “Everyone agrees that Bayesian logic compels this result, but no one 
seriously thinks it is the right outcome.”141 Describing the actual case on which Blue Bus 
is based, Andrea Roth writes that the court ruled in favor of the defendant because “…a 
rational prediction by the jury based on the evidence ‘was not enough’ absent an ‘actual 
belief’ in liability ‘in the mind or minds of the tribunal.’”142  Others have described basing 
                                                 
139 Nesson, “Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences,” 1192–93. 
140 There is significant controversy about what standard of proofs are meant to be. I largely gloss over these 
issues.   
141 Sullivan, “A Likelihood Story,” 45. 
142 Roth, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict,” 1164. (Quoting Smith 
at 755). 
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a judgment on purely statistical evidence as “patently absurd.”143 In addition, this intuition 
is shared by the participants in several psychology studies, which find, in general, that 
people are reluctant to make liability decisions when the evidence is based on naked 
statistics.144  
On the other hand, in what I think is a deficiency of the literature in this regard, 
there is an undue focus on the defendant—criminal and civil. When scholars (mostly legal 
scholars) give policy-based reasons for the insufficiency of statistical evidence, they often 
invoke notions of fairness.145 That is, fairness to the defendant. Neglected are the costs 
imposed on the plaintiffs (in civil cases) and on society, and perhaps the victims, (in 
criminal cases). In the criminal context, at least part of the justification for the criminal 
justice system is to keep people safe. In a related literature, scholars have debated not only 
what standards of proof mean, but, more provocatively, whether we are using the right 
standards. Using estimates of the likelihood of being the victim of a violent crime and being 
falsely convicted of such a crime, respectively, and the relative harms of each, Larry 
Laudan argues that we ought to lower the standard of proof in criminal trials.146 Even those 
                                                 
143 Allen and Stein, “Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof,” 574. (Cited in Sullivan, “A Likelihood 
Story,” 13.) 
144 Wells, “Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?”; Wright et al., 
“Factors Affecting the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability.”  
145 Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher, “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge” is a 
notable exception.  
146 See, generally, Laudan, The Law’s Flaws. For a pointed criticism of Laudan’s argument, see Gardiner, 
“In Defence of Reasonable Doubt.” 
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who do not agree with Laudan’s analysis recognize the substantial costs to ignoring 
evidence, as discussed, above.  
In American law, for example, the Exclusionary Rule precludes evidence’s 
admission in court when it is obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.147 For example, if the police enter someone’s house without consent or a warrant, 
as required by the 4th Amendment, and discover incriminating evidence, that evidence 
cannot be admitted at trial. This is to disincentivize police investigators from violating 
rights in order to obtain probative information.148 The Exclusionary Rule and resulting 
doctrines require that factfinders disregard what may be known to be accurate, relevant, 
incriminating, and even dispositive evidence. In general, however, there is no right to have 
unlawfully obtained evidence excluded from trial.149 Notwithstanding certain 
                                                 
147 Weeks v. U.S. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), incorporated to the states in Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
148 Although throughout the 20th Century the Court has given different rationales for the Exclusionary Rule, 
over time it has all but given up on non-deterrent rationales. In Nardone v. US, the Court ruled not 
only that unlawful phone taps were inadmissible, but also evidence derived from the unlawful tap. 
(308 US 338, 341)(1939). To do otherwise, the Court held, would be “ ‘inconsistent with the ethical 
standards and destructive of personal liberty.”(id). That was in 1939. In 1961, the court in Mapp 
called the exclusionary rule an “essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”(at 
657). In Hudson v. Michigan, the majority writes “the exclusionary rule has never been applied 
except where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” (Hudson v. Michigan 547 
US 586, 594 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Note the departure from the lofty language in earlier 
cases. Indeed, for the majority in Hudson, Justice Scalia writes that the Court has revised its view 
on the expansiveness of Mapp: “we have long since rejected that approach.” (at 591). Justice Scalia 
writes that the “massive remedy” of exclusion “has never been applied except where its deterrence 
benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”(Hudson at 595)(internal citations omitted). In 
Hudson, we see the completion of the Court’s transformation from relying on reasons of Fourth 
Amendment protections or judicial integrity to purely the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule. 
149 The rights violation is thought to occur when and only when the unlawful search is conducted, not when 
that evidence is admitted at trial. In its decision in Herring v. U.S., the Court writes, “…the 
exclusionary rule is not an individual right…” They continue: “We have repeatedly rejected the 
argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.” (555 U.S. 
135, 141)(2009). But some scholars feel differently. See, e.g., Re, “The Due Process Exclusionary 
Rule.” (Locating the right to exclusion in the 5th Amendment’s Due Process clause.) 
 86 
disagreements, we ought to recognize the substantial costs in throwing away or discounting 
evidence: more guilty defendants walk free and more plaintiffs are not made whole. Justice 
Louis Brandeis famously commented on the Exclusionary Rule: “The criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered.”150 
Without stating a position on the purpose of the criminal justice system, or of 
damage awards, I think I can safely state an uncontroversial but rebuttable presumption: 
all relevant evidence should receive its due. Whatever the function of trials, it is 
presumptively the case that that function is better-achieved when all relevant evidence is 
considered.151 I don’t need an argument for why there are strong reasons in favor of 
convicting the guilty, or of declaring a judgment for a plaintiff when they’ve been harmed. 
Disagreement about the function of the trial and the optimal distribution of error will affect 
when the presumption is rebutted, but it’s important to note the cost of such a rebuttal, as 
the Court repeatedly does.152  
For the kinds of cases described above, most scholars have explained the data and 
defended the intuitions. First, they give some account of the difference between statistical 
evidence and individualized evidence. Then they explain what (decisive) normative 
                                                 
150 People v. Defore 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
151 Laudan (ms) “The Social Contract and the Rules of Trial: Re-Thinking Procedural Rules.” 26-7. 
Unpublished draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075403. 
152 Nardone v. US, 308 US 388 (1939) at 340: “Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant 
in criminal prosecutions is heavily handicapped. It must be justified by an over-riding public policy 
expressed in the Constitution or the law of the land.”; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) at 442: 
“this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of 
constitutional and statutory protections.”; Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586 (2006) at 591: “The 
exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs[.]” 
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implications this difference has. Without questioning the distinctions that others have 
drawn between statistical and individualized evidence, I argue that the normative 
implications they draw are either misguided, or else, not decisive. That is, the difference 
between statistical evidence and individualized evidence could be relevant but not decisive 
in determining whether a factfinder can rest a judgment entirely on statistical evidence. It 
is good to keep in mind that shortcomings in statistical evidence, whatever they are, are not 
necessarily decisive against its use.  
4.2.2 NON-ACCURACY-BASED EPISTEMIC REASONS FOR THE INSUFFICIENCY OF 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
Philosophers have offered a wealth of views to defend the insufficiency of 
statistical evidence for conviction or a finding. Mostly, the rationalizations have relied on 
what I’ve called non-accuracy-based epistemic considerations. Broadly, philosophers have 
argued either that statistical evidence lacks a property necessary for knowledge or that it 
lacks a property necessary for belief.  
Conceptual analysis of propositional knowledge is often dated to Socrates’ 
discussion in the Theaetetus, in which Socrates gives the justified, true belief account that 
remained (mostly) popular until Edmond Gettier’s influential 1963 paper “Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?” answered the titular question in the negative.153 So-called Gettier 
cases are instances in which the subjects have justified true belief and yet the intuition is 
that they lack knowledge. Prefiguring Gettier, Bertrand Russell offers his famous stopped 
                                                 
153 But see Dutant, “The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis.” (Giving a revisionist history of the 
JTB account). 
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clock case, in which a person walks by a broken clock, which had until recently been 
working, at the very time at which the clock is stopped.154 We’re meant to think that, though 
the person who walks by is justified in believing the time based on what the clock reads, 
and truly believes that it is the time the clock displays, he nevertheless fails to know the 
time. Gettier, in his paper, offers similar cases, and in the half-century that’s followed, 
scholars have both offered new cases and tried to determine the missing necessary 
condition for knowledge, or else to make more robust the justificatory condition. So-called 
Lottery cases, in which one assigns very high probability to their having lost the lottery, 
but fails to believe or know it, have occasioned a similar kind of response.155 
The important question we should ask is whether the kinds of answers to Gettier 
and lottery type cases are, if correct in that context, relevant to the legal case. I believe that 
they are largely not. Notwithstanding the correct answer to that question, scholars have not 
done enough to make the connection explicit. Thus, even if it’s the case that Gettier-style 
counterexamples show that, safety, say, or adroitness, is necessary for knowledge or belief, 
it is a further question what relevance this has for legal fact-finding.  
4.2.2.1 Knowledge 
Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that in order for evidence to be sufficient for 
conviction, there has to be a causal connection between the evidence presented and the 
crime. Like knowledge, a verdict should not rest on luck. As Thomson puts it, someone’s 
                                                 
154 Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, 170–71. 
155 See, e.g., Dogramaci, “A Problem for Rationalist Responses to Skepticism,” 359. (Arguing, in part, that 
the statistical inference in lottery cases does not suffice for knowledge). 
 89 
“…reason for believing that p is true must ensure, or guarantee, that p is true.”156 On one 
causal account of knowledge, the fact that p has to cause the evidence. For example, in 
Blue Bus, the bus’s redness causally explains the testimony that the bus is red.157 As 
Thomson writes, “…this is because the accident-causing cab’s actually being red…would 
causally explain its looking red to that witness.”158 This is what Thomson calls “backward-
looking” individualized evidence. In contrast, she writes, if it turns out that Red Cab had 
given a raucous, booze-soaked party, then this would constitute “forward-looking” 
individualized evidence that someone from Red Cab had caused the accident.  
In contrast to statistical evidence, she writes, individualized evidence “is evidence 
which is in an appropriate way causally connected with the (putative) fact that the 
defendant is guilty, and hence (putatively) guarantees the defendant’s guilt…”159 What 
would suffice for a causal connection, does Thompson think? As Gardiner notes, 
Thomson’s account of the appropriate causal account of knowledge is underspecified, and 
this is without addressing both the notoriously difficult connection between causation and 
knowledge and the necessity of knowledge for legal proof.160  
                                                 
156 Thomson, “Liability and Individualized Evidence,” 208. 
157 See Gardiner, “Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence,” 4–7. (Offering a treatment of 
Thomson’s argument. Importantly, Gardiner worries Thomson’s account of causality is 
underexplained, and argues that statistical evidence can play the relevant causal role Thomson 
desires. Second, Gardiner worries about Thomson’s guarantee condition, especially as it would 
pertain to DNA evidence.)  
158 Thomson, “Liability and Individualized Evidence,” 203.  
159 Thomson, 214. 
160 See Gardiner, “Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence,” 4. Especially fn 13. 
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In a somewhat lengthy response to the Thomson-type argument, Ferdinand 
Schoeman points out that the law makes no such distinction between evidence that is and 
is not causally relevant. Focusing on Thomson’s distinction between “internal” and 
“external evidence,” he writes “she does not explain why we should require evidence to be 
internal before we regard it as reliably probative.”161 That her causality requirement is 
intuitive but not easy to explain is something Thomson herself recognizes.162 She 
essentially compares it to an anti-luck condition for knowledge. She argues that it is unjust 
for the jury to convict when it is just by luck if the jury gets things right. 
But what Thomson does not do, as she says it is difficult to do, is give a principled 
reason for thinking that this causal connection, even if necessary for knowledge, is 
necessary for a conviction or finding of liability.  
In her book, Probabilistic Knowledge, Sarah Moss applies her novel account of 
knowledge to the statistical evidence paradox. Describing with some approval the work 
others have done to argue that knowledge is required for holding a defendant responsile, 
Moss notes, however, that even if the knowledge requirement seems apt for juries in 
criminal cases, where the standard of proof is very high, it seems inapt in civil cases, where 
the standard is far lower. As she puts it, “Suppose the criminal standard of proof requires 
a justified full belief that the defendant is guilty. If this is correct, then what attitude does 
                                                 
161 Schoeman, “Statistical vs. Direct Evidence,” 190. 
162 “If we had individualized evidence…then we would feel considerably less reluctant to impose liability 
on Red Cab. Why is that? That seems to me a very hard question to answer.” Thomson, “Liability 
and Individualized Evidence,” 205. She adds, implicating others: “Friends of the idea that 
individualized evidence is required for conviction have not really made it clear why this should be 
thought true.” (206).  
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the civil standard [the applicable standard in Gatecrasher] require?”163 It can’t be full belief; 
it has to be something like more likely than not. Moss continues: 
…proof by a preponderance of the evidence cannot merely require that the 
factfinder be justified in having greater than .5 credence that the defendant is liable. 
… Gatecrasher demonstrates that there is still something missing from our 
explanation of why merely statistical evidence is often insufficient to prove guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as we have not yet explained why merely statistical 
evidence is often insufficient for proof by any standard at all.164 
 
The advantage of her probabilistic account of knowledge, she says, is that it preserves the 
requirement that the jury know something, which many others have argued for in the 
criminal context, while extending the analysis to civil cases—legal proof, she says, requires 
knowledge, no matter the standard of proof.165 With her new, probabilistic account of 
knowledge, Moss argues that proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires that the factfinder 
“know[] a certain probabilistic content, namely that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant is guilty.”166 And, whereas the civil standard can’t require that the factfinder 
know the defendant is liable, because the standard of proof is merely preponderance of the 
evidence (more likely than not), as Moss puts it, “…proof of liability by a preponderance 
of the evidence requires that the factfinder know that the defendant is probably liable.”167 
 As with Thomson, though, Moss’ discussion lacks an argument, or even an 
explanation for the intuition, that legal proof requires knowledge. Why should we think that 
                                                 
163 Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, 207. 
164 Moss, 208. 
165 Moss, 211. 
166 Moss, 201. 
167 Moss, 210. (Emphasis in the original). 
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defendants have a right that the jury know that they are probably liable? Such a right has 
never before been recognized, or even articulated. One reason to be skeptical of a right that 
the jury know the defendant is probably liable, or any even remotely similar statement, is 
that it is absent from a sampling of model civil jury instructions on the preponderance of 
the evidence standard from several U.S. circuit courts, on which state jury instructions are 
often modeled.168  
4.2.2.2 Belief 
Another strategy in this field comes in response to a focus on formalization and 
discussion of degrees of belief, or credences, where a credence is the subjective probability 
one assigns to the truth of a proposition. There is much debate over the relationship between 
                                                 
168 O’Malley, Grenig, and Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, vol. 3, sec. 101:41.: 
3rd Circuit:  
[Plaintiff] has the burden of proving [his/her/its] case by what is called the preponderance of the 
evidence. That means [plaintiff] has to prove to you, in light of the all the evidence, that what 
[he/she/it] claims is more likely so than not so. To say it differently: if you were to put the evidence 
favorable to [plaintiff] and the evidence favorable to [defendant] on opposite sides of the scales, 
[plaintiff] would have to make the scales tip somewhat on [his/her/its] side. If [plaintiff] fails to 
meet this burden, the verdict must be for [defendant]. If you find after considering all the evidence 
that a claim or fact is more likely so than not so, then the claim or fact has been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 
5th:  Plaintiff [x] has the burden of proving [his/her] case by a preponderance of the evidence. To 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove something is more likely so than not 
so. If you find that Plaintiff [name] has failed to prove any element of [his/her/its] claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then [he/she/it] may not recover on that claim. 
8th:  You will have to decide whether certain facts have been proved [by the greater weight of the 
evidence]. A fact has been proved [by the greater weight of the evidence], if you find that it is more 
likely true than not true. You decide that by considering all of the evidence and deciding what 
evidence is more believable. 
9th:  “When a party has the burden of proving any claim…by a preponderance of the evidence, it means 
you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim … is more probably true than not true.” 
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credences and belief—in particular, whether the latter is reduceable to the former. One 
might think that belief just is credence past a certain threshold—whether a stable threshold 
or one that changes depending on context. 
Lara Buchak weighs in on this debate. She first argues that beliefs do not reduce to 
credences, and that this is explained, at least in part, by the unique role belief plays in 
assigning blame. She gives cases that are meant to elicit the intuition that two cases, both 
of which license the same degree of belief, do not both license belief, because in only one 
of the cases is blame appropriate. In the cases Buchak gives, the only important difference 
is that the evidence in one case is statistical, and individualized in the other. But, she says, 
“…what is interesting about statistical evidence is that it is often by itself not enough to 
produce a belief that p, even when [the credence] is very high.”169 Belief and credences are 
sensitive to different kinds of evidence, she writes. And blame is sensitive to belief, but not 
credence.170 She articulates the subjective version of the BLAME NORM: “Blame 
someone if and only if you believe (or know) that she has transgressed…”171 Because juries 
are called on not only to determine the facts, but also to “take a stand about whether [the 
defendant] is guilty,” and because (by the BLAME NORM) assigning blame requires 
belief, and because statistical evidence cannot give rise to belief, statistical evidence alone 
cannot license a jury’s verdict.172  
                                                 
169 Buchak, “Belief, Credence, and Norms,” 292. 
170 Buchak, 296–97. 
171 Buchak, 299. 
172 Buchak, 301. 
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Andrea Roth makes a similar claim. She writes that the reasonable doubt standard 
“…requires factfinders to reach an ‘actual belief’ in, rather than an acknowledgment of a 
high probability of, the defendant’s guilt.”173 Her explanation is largely historical, and 
draws from the common law notion of “moral certainty,” which, at least historically, must 
be based on testimony and perception, and which the “reasonable doubt” language replaced 
in the 19th Century.174 
There are a few ways to dispute Buchak’s claims. First, we might bight the bullet 
and contest her description of the (appropriate) intuitions she has in the cases—perhaps we 
would count ourselves as having a full belief in the statistical cases she gives. Second, we 
might contest her description of blame as requiring belief and not merely high credence. 
That is, we might think to ourselves well, even if I wouldn’t have had the belief, my high 
credence does license blame. But perhaps the most profitable response we could make to 
Buchak is to question that the role of the trial is the assignment of blame, at least in the 
way she describes. One might say that if the trial’s role is to assign blame, it requires 
something different from what she requires for interpersonal blame in the cases she 
presents. And, even if she’s right in the criminal context, which it’s not clear she’s done 
sufficient work to convince the reader that she is, it’s far from clear that the purpose of a 
civil trial is to assign blame in any sense reminiscent of the reactive attitudes we have 
                                                 
173 Roth, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict,” 1159. 
174 Roth, 1160. 
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toward each other.175 One prominent strain of tort theory—the economic approach—does 
not countenance blame, in any moral sense, at all.176  
4.3 Statistical Evidence as Sufficient for Conviction or a Liability 
Judgment 
4.3.1 THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE  
Philosophers who argue for the insufficiency of statistical evidence in the legal 
context often overstate the extent to which the courts agree with them. 177 (Though, in their 
defense, it is often difficult to track the courts’ less than systematic approach to statistical 
                                                 
175 Buchak, “Belief, Credence, and Norms,” 304.  
176 Judge Calabresi describes tort law in the following way: “[It is] axiomatic that the principle function of 
accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents…” 
(Cited in Posner, “Guido Calabresi’s ‘The Costs of Accidents’: A Reassessment,” 15–16., quoting 
The Cost of Accidents at 26-28.) 
177 See, e.g., “It is important to note that the statistical evidence is not inadmissible; rather, it is insufficient 
on its own.” (Discussing the evidence in the Blue Bus case, in particular. Emphasis in the original). 
Buchak, “Belief, Credence, and Norms,” 290–91.  
“In [a version of the Gatecrasher case,] courts will find for the defendant.” Blome-Tillmann, “Sensitivity, 
Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law,” 103., Adding, “The intuitive distinction 
between individual and bare statistical evidence can be found in a large number of court judgments 
and is drawn frequently, with more or less rigour, in the legal and philosophical literature.” Blome-
Tillmann, 104.  
“We would never convict someone of a crime based on statistical evidence alone.” Jackson, “Belief, 
Credence, and Evidence,” 5.  
“Law courts would not adjudicate in favor of the claimants…” (Giving versions of five canonical cases, 
including Gatecrasher, Blue Bus, and Prison Yard.) (Gardiner, forthcoming, 3).  
Smith 2018 and Dant 1988, respectively, make somewhat weaker claims, which seem a bit misleading 
nonetheless, (though I don’t mean to suggest intentionally so): “Indeed, it seems generally true that 
courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts—verdicts of guilt or liability—on evidence that is 
purely statistical in nature.” Smith, “When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?,” 1195. Adding, 
“…courts’ general reluctance to rely on purely statistical evidence.” (1213, fn 18) but noting, in 
addition, that “…the legal treatment of statistical evidence has not been entirely consistent.” (1195, 
fn 3). 
 “Courts and commentators often defend the traditional view that statistical evidence is alone insufficient to 
support a verdict by appealing to the injustice of imposing liability based on statistical data.” Gant, 
“Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability,” 33.  
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evidence.178) They do not engage, to any significant degree, with the cases in which 
statistical inference is sufficient for a judgment of liability in the civil context. While it 
may be true that courts would regard as insufficient the statistical evidence available in the 
canonical cases presented in the philosophical literature, there are many, many kinds of 
cases in which the courts do permit statistical evidence to be sufficient. For example, in the 
civil context, statistical evidence is sufficient for judgement in employment discrimination 
cases and in market share liability cases. Slightly more controversially, statistical evidence 
is used, decisively, in bail and sentencing determinations, although these are not subject to 
the same standard of proof considerations as determinations of guilt or liability. As distinct 
from the use of statistical evidence in trials, the use of so-called “risk-assessment” in bail 
and sentencing is thought by some to be subject to racial bias,179 which would constitute 
both an accuracy-based epistemic reason and a policy reason against its use.   
Of course, that judges have held that statistical evidence is sometimes sufficient 
does not justify the practice, but to the extent it is an endorsed for principled reasons, in a 
wide variety of cases, despite what is broadly denied or downplayed in the philosophical 
literature, and to the extent that it constitutes good policy, it does. Below, I highlight several 
                                                 
178 See, e.g., the difference in the Supreme Court’s holdings in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo 136 S. Ct. 
1036 (2016) and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 388 (2011), as discussed in Bone, “Tyson 
Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication.” See also Amit Pundik, who notes that “case law 
seems to lack a systematic approach to statistical evidence.” Pundik, “The Epistemology of 
Statistical Evidence,” 117. But see Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are 
Relevant?” (Giving a systematic assessment of when courts seem to approve or disapprove of the 
sufficiency of statistical evidence). 
179 See, e.g., Mayson, “Bias In, Bias Out,” 6.; Slobogin, “Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and 
Policing,” 589–93. (Arguing that, properly guided by the relevant principles of fit, validity, and 
fairness, risk-assessment algorithms are to be preferred over individualized professional judgment).  
 97 
instances in which the courts have held that statistical evidence is sufficient for liability 
judgments, and argue that, were we to countenance the arguments made by many 
philosophers, remedies would be largely unavailable to many different kinds of injured 
parties.  
4.3.1.1 The Criminal Context 
As forensic science has become more sophisticated, DNA evidence’s use in 
criminal trials has increased,180 as have debates about its proper use.181 In a pure cold hit, 
the DNA match between the defendant and the relevant material is the only evidence. Some 
criminal defendants have attempted to argue that cold hit DNA evidence cannot be 
sufficient for conviction because it puts them in a class of suspects rather than uniquely 
identifying them as the culprit. But, as Andrea Roth puts it, appellate courts have 
“uniformly rejected” these arguments.182 This is broadly in line with Jonathan Koehler’s 
descriptive analysis of when courts tend to allow the sufficiency of statistical evidence. 
DNA cases represent instances where judges tend to allow the sufficiency of statistical 
evidence because they “rebut the suggestion that the outcome arose by chance.” 183  
                                                 
180 Roth, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict,” 1140–41.  
181 See Wasserman, “Forensic DNA Typing,” 349; Semikhodskii, Dealing with DNA Evidence: A Legal 
Guide, 136. 
182 Roth, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict,” 1150. See also Missouri 
v. Abdelmalik, 273 S.W.3d 61 (2008), cited in Di Bello, “Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability 
of Guilt Enough to Convict?,” 30 fn 46. 
183 Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,” 388–89. 
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In most cases, the courts have relied on the extremely high probability of the DNA 
evidence’s accuracy.184 As Roth sees it, the court’s willingness to countenance this 
admittedly and exclusively statistical evidence is because the probabilities of correct DNA 
matches can be incredibly high—so high as to license “actual belief”, or moral certainty. 
Roth writes, “[a]s the probability of guilt becomes closer and closer to certainty … a 
statistical statement of the likelihood of guilt may actually be transformed in the jurors’ 
minds from probabilistic evidence to individualized evidence justifying an actual belief in 
the defendant’s guilt.”185 Putting it slightly differently, Roth writes, “…when source 
probabilities are high enough, they are effectively transformed into statements of certainty 
rather than probability.”186 
If, as Roth argues, the difference between DNA evidence and other statistical 
evidence is the extremely high likelihood of a correct match in the DNA evidence, this 
does not match the explanations for the intuitions expressed about Gatecrasher-style cases 
in most of the philosophical literature.187 As one pair of scholars put it,  
[i]t will be interesting to see whether such legal theories will be challenged by the 
sheer statistical power of the probabilities generated by forensic DNA matches, 
which, some might say, make the DNA database “a system not of evidence but of 
proof.”188  
 
                                                 
184 Roth, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict,” 1150. 
185 Roth, 1169. 
186 Roth, 1158–59. 
187 Marcello Di Bello is one notable exception. He argues, for accuracy-based epistemic reasons, that we 
ought not rely on statistics in the Prison Yard-type cases but we may be able to, in DNA evidence 
cases Di Bello, “Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?,” 29–32.  
188 Cole and Lynch, “The Social and Legal Construction of Suspects,” 51.  
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But the point of the Prison Yard style cases, I took it, is to show that no matter how 
many prisoners there are, no matter how confident the jury should be in the defendant’s 
guilt, when that high confidence is based on statistical evidence alone this does not suffice 
for conviction. Martin Smith’s argument for the insufficiency of statistical evidence in the 
legal domain relies on his “normic support” condition, where “a body of evidence E 
normically supports a proposition P just in case the circumstances in which E is true and P 
is false would be less normal, in the sense of requiring more explanation, than the 
circumstances in which E and P are both true.”189 Thus, even where the probability of some 
event is low it may not call out for much explanation, like, for example, winning the lottery: 
“The fact that there are 100 tickets in the lottery and only one winner does not normically 
support the proposition that ticket #72 has lost.”190 Thus, we can’t say we know that our 
ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, even though we could know, say, by testimony of a 
mostly-reliable witness, that the defendant committed the crime. In the Blue Bus case, for 
example, if the generally reliable witness had got things wrong—if she had hallucinated, 
or the Yellow Bus company had for some reason painted its busses blue and put “Blue Bus 
Company” signs on them, then we would expect some sort of explanation. As he puts it,  
It can’t ‘just happen’ that the testimony was wrong. But it could just so happen that 
the bus was not a Blue-bus in spite of the fact that 90% of the buses operating in 
the area on the day in question were Blue-Bus busses. While this might in a sense 
be surprising, given the proportions involved, it clearly wouldn’t demand any kind 
of further explanation.191 
 
                                                 
189 Smith, “When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?,” 1208. 
190 Smith, 1208. 
191 Smith, 1208. 
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But as he notes, “A normic standard of proof would block pure cold hit DNA 
convictions,” which tend to be allowed by the courts.192 How should we resolve this 
discrepancy? “The clash with the normic standard could be portrayed as a reason for being 
critical of such convictions, but could also be seen as a reason for resisting the standard 
and seeking an alternative solution to the legal puzzle of statistical evidence.”193 (Though 
he seems not to see this as a sufficient reason to do so.) Moreover, Smith’s account would 
have trouble countenancing other kinds of cases in which the courts routinely rely on 
statistical evidence. Would it call out for explanation if what seemed to be a pattern of 
discriminatory behavior in an employment scenario, for example, wasn’t intentional? On 
the normic support view, it seems like it wouldn’t.  
And, while Sarah Moss discusses the sufficiency of DNA evidence for knowledge, 
she doesn’t quite say whether, on her view of probabilistic knowledge, when (if ever) DNA 
evidence suffices for knowledge. 194 
One promising response is offered by Enoch and Fisher, which effectively 
highlights the often-confused way in which scholars discuss “statistical evidence.” They 
describe DNA evidence as “statistical evidence,” but argue that one draws not a statistical 
inference from such data, but rather an inference to the best explanaton. Rather than 
inferring from the defendant’s membership in some class that they are likely guilty, an 
inference from DNA evidence posits that the best explanation for the DNA match is that 
                                                 
192 Smith, 1214. 
193 Smith, 1214. 
194 Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, 218. 
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the defendant committed the crime.195 In this sense, while the evidence does appear 
statistical in nature, the inference involving it is not properly analogous to the paradoxical 
cases commonly given. This line of argument is one promising way for those who dislike 
statistical inference for legal liability to preserve the sufficiency of DNA evidence.196  
4.3.1.2 The Civil Context 
In the civil context, statistical evidence is widely admitted into evidence, and is 
often sufficient for a judgment for the plaintiff. This is not to say that the Gatecrasher and 
Blue Bus cases don’t have persuasive force. But to use these hypotheticals, or real-world 
approximations of them, as evidence that we ought not or that the courts do not consider 
similar evidence sufficient, is improper. Many of the civil cases where the courts have held 
statistical evidence to be sufficient for a finding is when so-called individualized evidence 
is impossible to gather. Here again, this is broadly in line with Koehler’s analysis of courts’ 
inclination toward or against the sufficiency of statistical evidence. Of three common 
reasons, he finds, that courts permit the evidence to be sufficient, one is where there exists 
no particularized information.197 In general, courts have allowed for the sufficiency of 
statistical evidence when, otherwise, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for genuinely 
injured parties to collect damages. 
                                                 
195 Enoch and Fisher, “Sense and ‘Sensitivity’: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical 
Evidence,” sec. III.C. 
196 Thanks to Sinan Dogramaci for bringing this to my attention. As far as I could tell, Enoch and Fisher are 
the only authors, in either the legal or philosophical literature, to make this distinction.  
197 Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,” 387–88. Adding that market 
share liability cases “provide another context in which general base rates are sometimes regarded as 
relevant, admissible, and even dispositive.” (at 399). 
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In toxic torts cases, for example, plaintiffs sue whoever is responsible for exposing 
them to toxins that they allege are the cause of their medical malady. Because it is often 
impossible to show that, say, a company’s toxic dump caused their disease, plaintiffs rely 
on epidemiological evidence to show causation between the company’s dump and their 
illness by showing an increase in disease relative to the normal incidence of the same 
disease in the population.  
As the court wrote in a representative and much discussed case, in toxic tort cases: 
[because] the chance that there would be particularistic evidence is in most 
cases quite small, the consequence of retaining the requirement [for 
particularistic evidence] might be to allow defendants who, it is virtually 
certain, have injured thousands of people and caused billions of dollars in 
damages, to escape liability.198  
 
Relatedly, in market share liability cases, for example—cases involving an injury 
from taking a generic drug produced by one of a small number of  manufacturers—the 
courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs even where they cannot show particularized 
evidence that the pill that made them ill came from any one manufacturer, in particular. 
Rather, the manufacturers of the drug are held liable in proportion to their share of the 
relevant market.199  
                                                 
198 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 836 (1984). For discussion, see Gant, 
“Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability,” 61–
69. 
199 See Sindel v. Abbot 1980 611-13; and Hymowitz 1989 at 511-512. For discussion, see Kaye, “The Limits 
of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple 
Causation.” (Arguing that, in multi-defendant cases, an interpretation of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard consistent with the reasoning of e.g., Sindel, is appropriate); Koehler, “When Do 
Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,” 399–400. (Pointing out that Sindel is indicative 
of the courts’ willingness to rely on statistical evidence when it would be implausible for plaintiffs 
to offer individualized evidence); Sara Moss discusses this case very briefly. Moss’ view, she writes, 
can account for the differing intuitions about the ability of statistical evidence to suffice for 
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Courts have ruled in a similar manner in employment discrimination cases, where, 
for example, it is alleged that an employer hires too few minority employees given the 
number of qualified minority employees in the relevant population.200 And in antitrust 
law.201 And securities class action cases.202 And in class action lawsuits: In Tyson Foods, 
for example, plaintiffs were workers at a meat processing plant who sued when they were 
not paid for time spent putting on and taking off protective work gear. The court allowed 
statistical sampling (using average times it took workers to dress) in determining whether 
workers were underpaid.203  
                                                 
knowledge. But, it’s not clear what Moss has to say about these kinds of cases. She writes that her 
“account of statistical evidence has an unusual strength: it can explain why verdicts against 
defendants [who are persons,] in Prison Yard and Gatecrasher seem especially intolerable in 
comparison with other verdicts [like Sindel] that might or might not be licensed by statistical 
evidence.” Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, 219. (Emphasis added.) 
200 See Bone, “Tyson Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication,” 612.“…disparate impact in a Title 
VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination on various grounds, 
including race, sex, and religion] is essentially a statistical concept calling for statistical proof.”; 
Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,” 386.; Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and; Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 US. 557  (cited in Pardo and Allen, 
“Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation,” 264, fn 137.); Hazelwood School District v. US 433 U.S. 
229 (Cited in Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,” 386.) 
201 See, Bone, “Tyson Foods and the Future of Statistical Adjudication,” 612.: “…statistical modeling is 
used in antitrust suits to determine damages when it is impossible to know directly what the 
counterfactual market free from the antitrust violation would have looked like.” Adding, in the 
antitrust case, “statistical evidence is the obvious—and often the only—way to prove the issue and 
generate a reasonably correct substantive result for each individual case.” (id).  
202 See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 34 S.Ct. 2398 (Cited in Allen and Pardo, “Relative 
Plausibility and Its Critics,” 24.; Burtis, Gelbach, and Kobayashi, “Error Costs, Legal Standards of 
Proof, and Statistical Significance,” 5. 
203 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1048. For discussion, see Bone, “Tyson Foods and the 
Future of Statistical Adjudication”; Allen and Pardo, “Relative Plausibility and Its Critics,” 24. 
Although, there is reason to think that this is a case of statistical sampling, and ought to be 
distinguished from the use of statistical evidence, e.g., base rates, Bone, “Tyson Foods and the 
Future of Statistical Adjudication,” pt. 2.: “[The Supreme Court] treats the case as one involving 
statistical evidence and employee-specific inferences when it actually involves substituting 
statistical averages for employee-specific fact finding. This makes it more like a case of statistical 
adjudication than a case of statistical evidence.” Bone, 610., but noting, however, “The distinction 
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4.3.1.3 Fairness Considerations 
The sufficiency of statistical evidence for liability judgments gives some reason to 
worry about fairness. Not only does it appear unfair to punish a person based on evidence 
that (admittedly) leaves a large chance of error and has nothing to do with that person, in 
particular, but it also leads to an odd conclusion: it allows for the double-counting of 
evidence. Take the Gatecrasher case, for example: If the evidence that 501 attendees went 
into the rodeo without a ticket is sufficient to convict any one of the 1000 guests, then it is 
also sufficient to convict all of the attendees, 499 of whom did buy a ticket. And this seems 
unfair, if not downright ridiculous. How can one resolve this apparent difficulty with the 
use of statistical evidence? I see (at least) three ways to respond.  
First, one might bite the bullet here and argue that while this seems odd, there is no 
contradiction or rights violation. Such a result would merely be an instantiation of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Of each individual case, civil cases admit of a 
high error rate. Why think there’s any principled difference between one case with a high 
chance of error and a large set of cases with a known number of errors? The latter is just 
what we have now with the body of cases the courts decide. Some objections to this kind 
of thinking are similar to the legitimacy worries that come up in the legal literature—what 
I’ve called policy reasons against the use of statistical evidence, and which I’ve discussed, 
briefly, above. 
                                                 
between statistical adjudication and statistical evidence is not always perfectly clear or precise.” 
Bone, 613. 
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Second, one could point out that this already happens in other domains in the law.204  
In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, for example, “the State was on record as maintaining that Stumpf 
and Wesley should both be executed on the ground that each was the triggerman, when it 
was undisputed that only one of them could have been.”205 On remand to consider due 
process violations, the Sixth Circuit held that no rights violation occurred. As Andrew 
Pollis puts it: 
According to the Sixth Circuit majority, “[a]ll that the prosecution did was to argue 
for two different inferences from the same, unquestionably complete, evidentiary 
record.” The dissenters had a notably different view, accusing the prosecution of 
“convenient flip-flopping” that “simply reeks of unfairness.” The dissent chastised 
the “unwavering commitment to a win-at-any-cost callousness that is directly at 
odds with our solemn oath to preserve and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.” As commentators have noted, the flip-flopping “plainly runs counter to the 
prosecutor's duty to seek justice.” And yet, the legal system is on record as 
tolerating two death sentences for a crime only one person could have committed.206 
 
Anne Poulin argues that this use of evidence is common, and that such use does 
constitute a due process violation.207 But she notes that courts have considered and rejected 
a number of challenges to the prosecutors’ use of this kind of evidence.208 Her style of 
argument does raise some interesting questions about when such a violation occurs. 
According to Poulin, it occurs at the time the prosecutor asserts the second position.209 It’s 
                                                 
204 This is the general strategy in Pundik, “What Is Wrong with Statistical Evidence? The Attempts to 
Establish an Epistemic Deficiency.” 
205 Bradshaw v. Stumpf 545 U.S. 175, 189 (2005). For a description of the case in the popular press, see 
Armstrong, “Two Murder Convictions for One Fatal Shot.” 
206 Pollis, “Trying the Trial,” 87–88. 
207 Poulin, “Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process.” 
208 Poulin, 1425 fn 4. 
209 Poulin, 1425. 
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at least preliminarily suspect to think that a due process violation occurs, as it were, outside 
the scope of one defendant’s trial. That is, how could it be that whether a due process 
violation occurs at A’s trial depends on what happens, say, six months later, in B’s trial? If 
the rights violation occurs, it’s odd to think it happens after the trial. But put this oddness 
aside. Some courts have ruled that it is a due process violation for a prosecutor to use one 
bit of evidence to secure mutually exclusive verdicts.210 Nunn argues that the use of 
statistical evidence is a due process violation for a similar but distinct reason: the mere fact 
that some bit of evidence could be used to secure the conviction of any number of people 
constitutes a due process violation if that evidence is used, even against one person.211 
As a last response to the problem of double-counting evidence, tort law could move 
wholesale to a sort of modified proportional liability scheme. In the market share liability 
cases discussed above, companies were held liable to the extent that their product was 
represented in the market. At bottom though, the judgement against any company was 
determined by the likelihood that they caused the harm, and, therefore, the total damage 
award was capped by the extent of the damage. Part of the worry with relying on statistical 
evidence in the Gatecrasher case, as discussed above, is that, if statistical evidence is 
sufficient for conviction, the rodeo owner could recover more than he is owed. If, for 
example, the tickets each cost $1, and 499 guests paid and 501 guests crashed, the owner 
                                                 
210  Nunn, “The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked Statistical Evidence,” 1418 fn 62–63. 
211 “…if the same naked statistical evidence could be used to convict any randomly selected member of a 
population, and the simultaneous conviction of the entire population would constitute a due process 
violation (due to the mutually exclusive nature of the crime), then the conviction of even one of 
those individuals constitutes a due process violation.” Nunn, 1427. 
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is owed $501. But if statistical evidence alone is sufficient for a judgment, he could collect 
$1 from each of the one thousand guests in 1000 individual trials. This is more than he is 
owed. 
In a modified proportional liability scheme, instead, the owner might be allowed to 
collect only $.51 from each guest. Thus, the damage award is capped. In a similar manner, 
in an individual case with statistical evidence, the plaintiff could instead recover damages 
in proportion to the weight of the evidence. This would require a more precisified analysis 
of the evidence, and perhaps a more nuanced jury deliberation, but it may be a workaround 
to some of the problems statistical evidence poses. This is not too far from what Poulin 
hints at, as a solution. She suggests, as an option to deal with the uncertainty: “…[the 
prosecutor] may embrace the uncertainty, acknowledge that she cannot prove which of the 
two pulled the trigger, and adjust her charge and sentencing goals downward.”212 
4.3.2 A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 
Both philosophers and legal scholars have offered sophisticated, if greatly varied, 
arguments for the insufficiency of statistical evidence as proof of guilt or liability. In some 
cases, the courts have agreed, though in far from a systematic way.  
Several psychology studies have found that people are reluctant to make judgments 
about legal responsibility (civil or criminal) when the evidence is based on naked 
statistics.213  This tendency is known as the “Wells Effect” and is named for the author of 
                                                 
212 Poulin, “Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process,” 1424–25. 
213 Wells, “Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?”; Wright et al., 
“Factors Affecting the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability”; Friedman and Turri, “Is 
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the first study on this topic. A representative statement from a follow-up study captures the 
phenomenon: “…people judge that knowledge is less likely to result from probabilistic 
evidence than from perception, and, moreover, [] people deny that knowledge is gained 
from probabilistic evidence.”214   
In describing the phenomenon, the experimenters have dismissed explanations of 
reticence involving an inability to understand the standard of proof, causal relevance, that 
the evidence is not sufficient to raise subjective probabilities to the necessary level, and 
fairness. In one study, Niedermeier et al identify what they call the “ease-of-simulation” 
effect, which is that jurors are more willing to acquit defendants when they can more easily 
imagine the situation in which the defendant is not guilty—often, but not always, when the 
evidence is circumstantial.215 
                                                 
Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?”; Niedermeier, Kerr, and Messé, “Jurors’ Use of 
Naked Statistical Evidence”; Sykes and Johnson, “Probabilistic Evidence Versus the Representation 
of an Event”; Arkes, Shoots-Reinhard, and Mayes, “Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict 
in Juror Decision Making.” 
214 Friedman and Turri, “Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?,” 5–6. 
215 “When probabilistic evidence of a defendant’s guilt contains information that can be used to build a 
possible (even if unlikely) scenario in which another party is responsible, jurors will be more 
reluctant to use that evidence to convict.” Adding, however, “…when probabilistic evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt contains little or no information that can be used to construct such an exonerating 
scenario, jurors will be more willing to rely on that evidence to convict.” Niedermeier, Kerr, and 
Messé, “Jurors’ Use of Naked Statistical Evidence,” 541–42. See also, for an expanded discussion, 
Heller, “The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence,” 290–98. 
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Andrea Roth agrees that this can explain often-disparate treatment of DNA 
evidence.216 Mike Redmayne, too.217 And this explanation appears similar to Smith’s 
account of normic support. And, it is supported by Koehler’s finding that courts downplay 
the probative weight of statistical evidence when there is individualized evidence, in 
addition.218 When the context does not merely involve the use of base rates or other 
statistical evidence, but also involves issues of morality, things get even muddier. In a now-
famous study, Tetlock et al show that when reasoning about sensitive moral issues, people 
are (even) less willing to rely on base rates.219 This finding is echoed in another study about 
statistical evidence at trials, noting the decidedly moral nature of the trial, especially 
criminal trials.220 Indeed, there is some reason to be cautious about relying on intuitions 
                                                 
216 “While juries tend to discount DNA match statistics when they can actually envision examples of other 
potential suspects in the population who might match, they will treat the match as ‘compelling proof’ 
of guilt when they can no longer envision such examples.” Roth, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding 
When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict,” 1168. 
217 Redmayne, “Exploring the Proof Paradoxes,” 304: 
This ‘ease of simulation’ explanation for the data also accounts for results in experimental research 
on DNA evidence. Here it has been found that mathematically equivalent ways of expressing the 
probative force of a DNA match have different effects on subjects: subjects think guilt more likely 
when told that ‘the probability that the suspect would match the blood drops if he were not the 
source is 0.1 percent’ than when told ‘1 in 1,000 people in Houston who are not the source would 
also match the blood drops.’ This seems to be because the latter formulation makes the possibility 
of a match with an innocent person easier to imagine. 
  
218 Koehler, “When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?” 395. 
219 Tetlock et al., “The Psychology of the Unthinkable,” 865–66:  
Unparsimonious though it may strike those who aspire to create universal theories of social 
cognition, the current findings suggest that people place a complex host of superficially ad hoc 
content constraints on how they execute trade-offs, use base rates, and apply causal schemata to 
narratives. People who function like intuitive scientists or economists in one setting can be quickly 
transformed into intuitive moralist-theologians when provoked by assaults on sacred values. 
220 “…what the laws of probability indicate is likely to have occurred—is generally viewed as an 
unacceptable basis for holding the defendant liable for the actual event.” (Discussing Charles 
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when it comes to statistical evidence: base-rate neglect, for example, has been well-
documented. 
The psychological studies, however, don’t tell us what to do with their findings. 
What we learn is that the behavior of juries is broadly (but not entirely) in line with 
philosophical theory: for non-accuracy based epistemic reasons, juries, and to some extent, 
judges, are less likely to attribute responsibility, or knowledge, when the evidence is 
statistical. But is there good reason for doing so? As far I could determine, there is no 
mention of a “Wells Fallacy” in the literature, as there is, for example, in descriptions of 
base rate neglect. 221 The psychological literature merely describes a tendency. Perhaps it 
offers an explanation for why one philosophical theory has largely tended one way on the 
question of statistical evidence. But it does not justify the theory.   
4.4 Conclusion 
I’ve argued that explanations for the insufficiency of statistical evidence, even if 
they provide solid non-accuracy-based epistemic reasons, do not convincingly show why 
legal fact-finders should care about these reasons. Indeed, in many civil contexts, where 
otherwise remedies to injured parties would be impossible to obtain, statistical evidence’s 
sufficiency for liability is necessary. While there may be documented reticence to ascribe 
                                                 
Nesson’s argument that even juries who ascribe great weight to the evidence nevertheless resist that 
the defendant committed the crime). Sykes and Johnson, “Probabilistic Evidence Versus the 
Representation of an Event,” 211. 
221 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” 
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blame or liability using statistical inference, it’s far from clear that our intuitions here ought 
to guide findings of legal liability.  
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